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TAX PLANNING FOR DISPOSITIONS OF REAL ESTATE
by
Charles H. Egerton '
Dean, Mead, Egerton, Bloodworth, Capouano & Bozarth, P.A.
Orlando, Florida
I. Tax Planning in Perspective. Investors and business
persons generally share common objectives in structuring
any transaction for the disposition of real estate.
These objectives, in their simplest form, usually include
the maximization of the net proceeds received from the
sale and, if any portion of the sale price is to be
deferred, to protect against the risk of not receiving
the balance of the sales price. Income taxes imposed
upon the seller's gain from the sale are generally the
largest cost borne by the seller in such a transaction.
Consequently, a great deal of time and attention is
deservedly focused upon structuring transactions in a
manner that will minimize or defer income taxes to the
extent legitimately possible. However, tax planners
should always keep in mind that tax minimization
represents only one element of the seller's ultimate
objectives. Over-planning or dogged adherence to a tax
plan the other side finds objectionable will often result
in a lost sale and/or the exposure of the seller to a
higher degree of risk that may ultimately cost the client
more than the amount of the potential tax savings. This
outline will focus on a number of tax planning
considerations and opportunities that may be employed to
minimize or defer a seller's income tax upon a
disposition of real estate. However, it is important to
keep in mind that we, as tax professionals, must never
lose sight of the fact that our tax planning efforts
should always contribute to the achievement of the
client's ultimate objectives of accomplishing a sale and
ultimately receiving the maximum net proceeds from the
disposition.
II. Installment Reporting.
A. Historical development. Installment reporting of
gains from the disposition of property has been a
part of our income tax system since it was first
introduced by the Revenue Act of 1926. The
installment reporting provisions were enacted for the
salutary purpose of enabling a seller whose sale
i The author expresses appreciation to H. Bryan Ives, III,
Esquire, of Charlotte, N.C. for permission to reprint a portion
of his material in Part III.E. of this outline.

proceeds will be fully or partially deferred until
later years to pay his taxes proportionately as he
receives his money. The installment sales provisions
were substantially revised by the Installment Sales
Revision Act of 1980 (the "Installment Sales Act"), a
statutory model that was widely acclaimed both for
its equity and its simplicity.
B. overview of installment reporting provisions.
1. An installment sale is defined in S453(b)(1) as a
. . . disposition of property where at least 1
payment is to be received after the close of the
taxable year in which the disposition occurs."
2. Under the installment reporting method, a portion
of each payment received by the taxpayer must be
reported as income. The portion to be recognized
as income is determined by multiplying the
payment by a fraction, the numerator of which is
the "gross profit" realized or to be realized in
the transaction, and the denominator is the
"total contract price." This is referred to as
the "gross profit percentage." Temp. Reg.
§15A.453-1(b)(2)(i).
a. "Profit" is the selling price less the
taxpayer's adjusted basis in the property.
Temp. Reg. §15A.453-1(b)(2)(v).
b. "Total contract price" is the selling price
less "qualified indebtedness" assumed or
taken subject to by the buyer to the extent
that such qualified indebtedness does not
exceed the seller's basis. Temp. Reg.
§15A.453-1(b)(2)(iii). Qualified
indebtedness generally means debt encumbering
the property, subject to certain limitations.
See, Temp. Reg. S15A.453-1(b)(2)(iv). If
qualified indebtedness assumed or taken
subject to exceeds the seller's basis, such
excess will be treated as an additional
payment to the seller at closing. Temp. Reg.
§15A.453-1(b)(iii).
In summary, qualified
indebtedness will not result in current
taxation to the seller except to the extent
that it exceeds the seller's basis in the
property.
c. If mortgage debt is incurred by a taxpayer in
contemplation of a disposition of the
encumbered property, which mortgage debt is
- 2 -

assumed or taken subject to by. the buyer,
such debt will not constitute "qualified
indebtedness" and the entire amount of such
debt will be treated as an additional payment
in the year of sale. Temp. Reg. S15A.4531(b)(2)(iv).
(1) In the absence of such a rule, a
potential seller of unencumbered property
might mortgage the property immediately
prior to the sale. Since borrowing
normally constitutes a nontaxable event,
the seller would receive the funds tax
free. Moreover, if the mortgage debt did
not exceed the seller's adjusted basis in
the property, the subsequent sale of the
property subject to the mortgage would
not result in an additional payment in
the year of sale under §453. Thus, the
seller would have cashed out part of his
investment in the property, but deferred
the recognition of gain attributable to
such interest through manipulation of the
installment reporting provisions.
d. A bona fide wrap-around mortgage will neither
be regarded as qualified debt nor as an
additional payment in the year of sale, even
if the amount of such debt exceeds the
seller's basis. See, discussion in II.G.,
infra.
e. "Payments" generally do not include a
purchase money note received from the seller
in connection with the sale, regardless of
whether such purchase money debt is
guaranteed by a third party. Temp. Reg.
§S15A.453-1(b)(3)(i). A standby letter of
credit (as defined in Temp. Reg. §15A.4531(b)(3)(iii)) will be treated as a third
party guarantee. However, a purchase money
note which is directly or indirectly secured
by cash or a cash equivalent (e.g., a bank
certificate of deposit or a treasury note)
will be characterized as a payment. Temp.
Reg. $15A.453-1(b)(3)(i).
"Payment" also
includes consideration received from the
buyer in the form of foreign currency,
marketable securities and notes which are
either payable upon demand or are readily
tradeable. Id.
- 3 -

(1) The Tax Court, in Estate of Mose
Silverman, 98 T.C. 54, (1992) held that
certificates of deposit received by the
seller were not "payments" but were the
equivalent of an installment obligation.
The taxpayers in Svman
owned stock in
a state chartered savings and loan
association which was acquired in a
merger by a federally chartered savings
and loan association. A portion of the
consideration received by the taxpayers
constituted non-withdrawable fixed rate
six-year certificates of deposit. Due to
the fact that the taxpayers could not
withdraw monies prior to the expiration
of six years and their ability to pledge
the certificates of deposits was also
limited, the Tax Court held that they
were equivalent to installment
obligations.
3. A taxpayer who disposes of property in an
installment sale must report his gain on the
installment method unless he elects out under
§453(d). The election not to report under the
installment method is made by filing IRS Form
6252 with a timely filed return (including
extensions) for the taxable year in which the
closing takes place. Temp. Reg. Sl5A.453l(d)(3)(i). Temp. Reg. Sl5A.453-1(d)(3)(i) also
provides that a taxpayer who reports an amount
realized equal to the selling price of the
property (including-the full face amount of any
installment obligation) on his return for the
year in which the sale closed will be considered
to have elected out of the installment method.
The election, once made, may not be revoked
without the consent of the IRS. S453(d)(3).
4. A number of limitations upon the use of
installment reporting are imposed including the
following:
a. Sales to related parties -- Under §453(e), a

taxpayer who sells property to a related
party (as defined in §453(f)(1)) may use the
installment method, but any amounts received
upon a subsequent disposition of the property
by the related party will be treated as a
payment received by the taxpayer unless an
exception applies. If the sale by the
- 4 -

related party occurs more than two years
after the first sale by the taxpayer to the
related party, generally the acceleration
rule will not apply unless the property that
was originally sold constituted marketable
securities.
b. Sales of depreciable property to related
party -- If depreciable property is sold to a

"related party," which, for purposes of this
provision, will be limited to parties described in either 51239(b) or 5707(b)(1)(B),
the seller will not be eligible to report on
the installment method. An exception to this
disallowance is available, however, if the
taxpayer can demonstrate to the Service that
he did not have as one of his principal
purposes the avoidance of federal income
taxes. 5453(g)(2).
c. Sales of property subject to §§1245 and 1250
recapture -- Any recapture income resulting

from the sale under S1245 and/or §1250 must
be reported in the year of sale. §453(i).
d. Dealer dispositions -- As a general rule,

"dealers" who are selling property held for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of
their trade or business will no longer be
eligible for installment reporting.
§§453(b)(2)(A) and 453(1). However, certain
dealers in timeshare properties and
residential lots may elect to utilize the
installment method under certain
circumstances. See, §453(1).
e. Special rules also apply under S1274 and
483. If an adequate rate of interest is not
charged, or (regardless of whether or not an
adequate rate of interest is charged) if
interest payments are not actually paid at
least annually, the original issue discount
rules will re-characterize a portion of what
otherwise would be denominated as principal
into interest. This may affect both the
character and the timing of recognition of
income attributable to these re-characterized
interest payments.
f. Disposition of installment obligations will
generally accelerate unreported gain, subject
- 5 -

to certain narrowly defined exceptions.
§453B.

See,

g. The pledge of certain installment obligations
to secure debt of the taxpayer will also
result in an acceleration to the extent
provided in §453A(d).
See, discussion in
II.E.3., below.
C. TRA '86 changes. Not content to leave well enough
alone, Congress, in search of revenues, couldn't
resist tinkering with the installment reporting
provisions once again.
1. The first inequity in the installment sales area
identified by Congress is described in the Senate
Finance Committee Report to TRA '86 as follows:
The committee believes that the ability to
defer taxation under the installment sales
method is inappropriate in the case of gains
realized by dealers in ordinary income
assets, and also with respect to gains
realized on certain business or rental
property, to the extent that the taxpayer has
been able to receive cash from borrowing
relating to its installment obligations.
S.Rpt. No. 313, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 123
(1986) (hereinafter, the "S.Rpt." or the
"Senate Report").
2. In response to this perceived inequity, TRA '86
enacted the so-called "proportionate disallowance
rule," which limited the use of the installment
sales method on certain sales of property based
on the amount of the outstanding indebtedness of
the seller. TRA '86 §811, enacting former §453C.
Additionally, TRA'86 required both individuals
and corporations to report the full amount of any
gains arising from sales of dealer real estate as
well as certain sales of real estate held either
in the taxpayer's trade or business or for rental
purposes in computing such taxpayer's alternative
minimum tax liability. In other words, for
alternative minimum tax purposes, TRA '86
completely disallowed installment reporting for
sales of dealer real estate as well as for
certain sales of real estate held in the
taxpayer's trade or business or for rental
purposes.
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D. TRA '86 alternative minimum tax rules. In addition
to subjecting a taxpayer to the proportionate
disallowance rule for regular tax purposes, TRA '86
also required that, in computing alternative minimum
taxable income for all taxpayers (individual and
corporate), the entire gain attributable to the
installment sale of property which would be treated
as giving rise to an applicable installment
obligation for former S453C purposes had to be
reported in full (i.e., no deferral of income was
allowed) (See, S56(a)(6) prior to its amendment by
the Revenue Act of 198.7).
E. Overview of Revenue Act of 1987 changes. Congress,
apparently realizing that it had made a mistake in
passing an extremely complex law (the proportionate
disallowance rule) to deal with a relatively simple
abuse of pledging an installment sales contract as
security for a loan, repealed the proportionate
disallowance rule in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987 ("OBRA"). The changes to
the installment sales rules made by OBRA can be
(1) changes affecting
divided into two categories:
use of the installment sales method by dealers; and
(2) changes affecting use of the installment sales
method by non-dealers.
1. Dealer sales under OBRA. Whereas the provisions
enacted by TRA '86 dramatically reduced the
benefit of the installment sales method to
dealers of real and personal property by means of
the proportionate disallowance rule and the
alternative minimum tax, OBRA generally denies
dealers (in real or personal property) use of the
installment sales method altogether.
5453(b)(2)(A) and §453(1). Thus, a dealer in
real or personal property must recognize the full
amount of gain on sale of dealer property in the
year of sale even if the dealer does not receive
full payment in the year of sale.
a. The new rules disallowing the use of the
installment sales method by dealers did not,
however, apply to the following types of
dispositions: installment sales of property
used or produced in the trade or business of
farming as defined in S2032A(e)(4) and 5 -§453(l)(2)(A); installment sales of timeshare
rights in residential real property for not
more than six weeks per year --

§453(i)(2)(B)(ii)(I); and installment sales
of residential lots if the taxpayer (or any
- 7 -

related person) is not to make any
improvements with respect to such lot -S453(1)(2)(B)(ii)(II). The exceptions for
sales of timeshare rights and residential
lots applied only with respect to sales to
individuals.
b. In order for a taxpayer to utilize the
installment sales method for sales of
timeshare rights and residential lots under
S453(l)(2)(B), the taxpayer must elect to
report such sales on the installment method
and to make interest payments to the Internal
Revenue Service (as calculated below) for the
period beginning on the date of the sale and
ending on the date such payment is received.
S453(l)(3). The interest is calculated by
multiplying the applicable federal rate
(compounded semi-annually) in effect at the
time of the sale by the amount of the tax for
the taxable year.which is attributable to
payments received during the taxable year on
the installment sales obligations for which
the election has been made. No interest is
due for payments received in the taxable year
of disposition from which the installment
sale obligation arises. §453(l)(3)(B)(iii).
c. As a planning tip, dealers who sell property
on an installment sales basis should plan
(1) receive sufficient payments
either to:
on the installment sales obligation during
the taxable year of the sale to enable the
dealer to pay the income tax liability
attributable to the sale; or (2) make sure
that the purchaser's obligation to pay the
installment payments is amply collateralized,
guaranteed and fully negotiable so that the
dealer can pledge the obligation for a loan
to enable the dealer to pay the tax liability
attributable to the sale.
d. The repeal of the installment sales method
for dealers of real and personal property is
generally effective for installment sales
obligations arising from dispositions
occurring after December 31, 1987. OBRA
§10202(e)(2)(A).
2. Non-dealer sales under OBRA. Rather than
prohibiting use of the installment sales method
altogether (as was done with respect to dealers),
- 8 -

S453A as enacted by the Revenue Act of 1987,
replaced the proportionate disallowance rule with
a less harsh provision that placed certain
restrictions on installment sales obligations
arising from the disposition of real property
used in the taxpayer's trade or business or held
for the production of rental income, the sales
price of which property exceeded $150,000. Such
installment sales obligations were referred to as
"non-dealer real property installment
obligations." OBRA also repealed the provision
of the Code which denied taxpayers use of the
installment sales method on non-dealer real
property installment obligations for alternative
minimum tax purposes. Under OBRA, taxpayers were
entitled to use the installment sales method with
respect to non-dealer real property installment
obligations for alternative minimum tax purposes.
a. The first restriction placed on non-dealer
real property installment obligations by new
§453A provided that to the extent the face
amount of all such obligations which arose
during the taxable year and which are
outstanding as of the close of such taxable
year exceeded $5,000,000, interest on the
"deferred tax liability" attributable to such
obligations must be paid to the Internal
Revenue Service by the taxpayer.
(1) Query: How is the $5,000,000 threshold
rule to be applied if there is a
contingent purchase price? Hopefully,
forthcoming regulations will address this
issue. See, discussion re: contingent
sales in II.H., infra.
(2) Query also: If an interest toll charge
is imposed under §454A but the buyer of
the property subsequently defaults, will
the taxpayer be allowed to recoup the
interest charge previously paid through a
refund, basis adjustment or any other
procedure?
b. The second restriction was that, regardless
of the $5,000,000 threshold set forth above,
such obligations would be subject to the
pledging rules of §454A(d).
c. The deferred tax liability and pledging rules
generally did not apply to installment
-
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obligations arising from the following types
of dispositions:
(1) dispositions (by an
individual) of "personal use property" within
the meaning of 51275(b)(3) -- 5453A(b)(3)(A);
(2) dispositions of property used or produced
in the trade or business of farming within
the meaning of S2032A(e)(4) or (5) -S453A(b)(3)(B); and (3) dispositions of
timeshare rights and residential lots
described in 5453(l)(2)(B), provided that the
interest payment rules of §453(l)(3) (rather
than those of §453A) were to be applied to
such installment sales obligations --

S453A(b)(A).
d. For purposes of determining whether a
taxpayer had a non-dealer real property
installment obligation (i.e., whether the
sales price of the property exceeded
$150,000), all sales or exchanges which were
part of the same transaction (or series of
related transactions) were treated as one
sale or exchange. 453A(b)(5).
e. If a non-dealer real property installment
obligation is outstanding as of the close of
any taxable year, the taxpayer's tax was to
be increased by the product of:
(1) the
"applicable percentage" of the "deferred tax
liability" with respect to such non-dealer
real property installment obligation;
multiplied by (2) the underpayment rate in
effect under 56621(a)(2) for the month with
or within which the taxable year of the
taxpayer ends. S453A)(c)2). The term
"deferred tax liability" is defined as the
product of the amount of gain with respect to
a non-dealer real property installment
obligation which has not been recognized as
of the close of such taxable year, multiplied
by the maximum rate of tax in effect under §i
or S11, whichever is appropriate, for such
taxable year. S453A(c)(3). The term
"applicable percentage" means, with respect
to non-dealer real property installment
obligations arising in any taxable year, the
percentage determined by dividing the portion
of the aggregate face amount of all such nondealer real property installment obligations
outstanding as of the close of such taxable
year in excess of $5,000,000, by the
aggregate face amount of such non-dealer real
-
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property installment obligations outstanding
as of the close of such taxable year.
§453A(c)(4). The applicable percentage for
any non-dealer real property installment
obligation as so computed will remain
constant throughout the entire period it
continues to be held by the taxpayer.
f. Expressed as an equation, a taxpayer's
increase in tax liability due to non-dealer
real property installment obligations was
calculated as follows:
Interest on Deferred Tax Liability =
(Applicable Percentage) x (Deferred Tax
Liability) x (§6621(a)(2) Underpayment Rate).
3. If any non-dealer real property installment
obligation is pledged as security for any
indebtedness (referred to as "secured
indebtedness"), the net proceeds of the secured
indebtedness are treated as a payment received on
such non-dealer real property installment
obligation as of the later of:
(1) the time
which the indebtedness becomes secured; or (2)
the time the proceeds of such secured
indebtedness are received by the taxpayer.
S453A(d)(1). However, the amount treated as
received under the pledging rules by reason of
any secured indebtedness cannot exceed the excess
(if any) of the total contract price under the
non-dealer real property installment obligation,
over any portion of the total contract price
received under the contract before the secured
indebtedness was incurred (including amounts
previously treated as received under the pledging
rules). As payments are actually received on
non-dealer real property installment obligations
which have been subject to the pledging rules,
such amounts are recovered tax free to the extent
such proceeds have already been treated as
received under the pledging rules. S453A(d)(3).
Additionally, the pledging rules provide that
indebtedness is secured by a non-dealer real
property installment obligation to the extent
that payment of principal or interest on such
indebtedness is directly secured (under the terms
of the indebtedness or any underlying
arrangements) by any interest in such non-dealer
real property installment obligation.
S453A(d)(4).
-
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4. The new restrictions placed on non-dealer real
property installment obligations by S453A were
generally effective for installment obligations
relating to dispositions occurring in taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1987. OBRA
510202(e)(1). However, taxpayers having nondealer real property installment obligations were
entitled to elect to have the new rules apply in
lieu of the proportionate disallowance rule for
taxable years ending after December 31, 1986,
with respect to dispositions and pledges
occurring after August 16, 1986. S10202(e)(3).
See, Notice 88-81, 1988-2 C.B. 397, for guidance
on how to apply the OBRA rules to 1986 and 1987
installment sales.
5. The new pledging rules of S453A(d) generally
applied to non-dealer real property installment
obligations pledged to secure any secured
indebtedness after December 17, 1987.
Additionally, if the taxpayer elected out of the
proportionate disallowance rule, the pledging
rules will apply to taxable years ending after
December 31, 1986. OBRA S10202(e)(3)(B).
6. The amendments allowing use of the installment
sales method with respect to non-dealer real
property installment obligations for alternative
minimum tax purposes applied to dispositions in
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1986.
Presumably, the amendments made to the
alternative minimum tax also apply to
dispositions made after August 16, 1986, and
before January 1, 1987, since, for purposes of
the proportionate disallowance rule, such
dispositions were deemed to have been made after
December 31, 1986.
F. 1988 and 1989 changes. The Technical and
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 ("TAMRA" or " '88
Act") expanded both the interest toll charge and the
pledge rules. The Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239 ("89 Act") made additional
minor and technical corrections to 9453A.
1. Both the interest toll charge and the pledge
rules will now apply to any post-1988 sale (i.e.,
S453A will no longer be confined to non-dealer
real property sales) that is otherwise eligible
for installment reporting where the sales price
exceeds $150,000, and, in the case of the
interest charge, where the $5,000,000 threshold
-
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is also met, except with respect to the following
types of properties:
a. Property used or produced in the trade or
business of farming. 5453A(b)(3).
b. TAMRA repealed the exemption previously
contained in the '87 Act version of §453A for
personal use property. This repeal was
apparently inadvertent because the Conference
Report to TAMRA clearly stated that the
revised rules do not apply to personal use
property. Conf. Rep., Statement of the
Managers 183 (10/24/88).
(1) The '89 Act corrected this error by
reinstating the exemption for personal
use property (as defined in S1275(b)(3).
See, new S453A(b)(3)(A) which is
effective as if included in TAMRA.
c. Timeshares and residential lots with respect
to which the taxpayer has elected to report
on the installment basis under 5453(l)(2)(B).
2. Prior to the '89 Act, 5453A was unclear with
respect to the deductibility of the interest
payable under that section. The Committee
Reports, however, stated that such interest was
to be treated as interest on an underpayment of
tax. See, Conf. Comm. Rpt., H.R. Rep. 100-495,
930 (12/21/87). This treatment assured that the
interest would be classified as "personal
interest" under §163(h). See, Temp. Reg. §1.1639T(b)(2). The '89 Act confirms this treatment by
the addition of new S453A(c)(5). Apparently the
toll charges could also be subject to the
interest capitalization rules of §263A(4).
3. Section 453A(c)(6) was added by TAMRA to
authorize the Commissioner to issue regulations
to prevent the avoidance of the rules of §453A
through the use of related persons, pass-through
entities and intermediaries and to also provide
rules to assure that the sale of an interest in a
pass-through entity (a partnership or an S corp.)
will be treated for purposes of §5453 and 453A as
a sale of the seller's proportionate share of the
assets of the entity.

-
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G. Wraparound mortgages.

1. Facts: Taxpayer ("TP") owns real property
("Value Land") with a basis of $500,000 and which
is encumbered by a mortgage with an outstanding
principal balance of $700,000 and bearing
interest at 8% per annum ("Original Mortgage").
TP receives an offer from Buyer to acquire Value
Land for $12,500,000, payable $2,500,000 down
with the balance of $10,000,000 payable in the
form of a purchase money note and mortgage
payable over seven years at 12% per annum, with
interest only for the first two years and the
balance payable over five years. The purchase
money note and mortgage "wrap around" the
$700,000 Original Mortgage (i.e., TP will
continue to be responsible for payment of
principal and interest on the Original Mortgage),
and Buyer will assume no responsibility
thereunder (and will be indemnified by TP against
the Original Mortgage).
2. General considerations:
a. From a non-tax prospective, the wraparound
purchase money mortgage provides TP the
opportunity to continue to benefit from the
favorable terms of the Original Mortgage
including the 8% interest rate (thereby
enjoying the benefit of the "spread" between
the 12% interest rate paid by Buyer under the
purchase money note and mortgage versus the
8% rate TP must pay on the Original
Mortgage). In addition, TP's "equity" in
Value Land will be considerably greater than
Buyer's for most of the term of the new
purchase money note and mortgage. The use of
a wraparound mortgage will provide TP with
additional security that payments will be
made on the Original Mortgage on a regular
basis and that no events will occur that
would give the holder of the Original
Mortgage the right to foreclose or otherwise
accelerate.
b. The principal tax issue is whether Buyer will
be deemed to have acquired Value Land
"subject to" the $700,000 balance of the
Original Mortgage. The consequences stemming
from the resolution of this issue are
significant to TP.
-
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(1) If the property is determined to have
been conveyed "subject to" the Original
Mortgage, TP will be deemed to have
received an additional payment in the
year of sale equal to the excess of the
$700,000 principal balance of the
Original Mortgage over the adjusted basis
in Value Land of $500,000, or $200,000.
Temp. Reg. S15A.453-1(b)(3)(i). In
addition, the gross profit percentage TP
must apply to the payments received in
the year of sale will be increased.
(2) The Service, in Temp. Reg. §15A.453l(b)(3)(ii) provided that any conveyance
of property which is encumbered by a
prior liability that is purportedly
"wrapped around" by a new purchase money
mortgage, will be deemed to have been
conveyed subject to the existing debt.
(3) Temp. Reg. S15A.453-1(b)(3)(ii) requires
the computation of a gross profit
percentage which is to be applied to
payments in the year of sale (computed in
the normal fashion) and a separate gross
profit percentage for the wraparound note
and mortgage.
The calculations called for under the
Regulations are as follows:
Selling Price

$ 12,500,000

Contract Price

$ 12,500,000
-

Selling Price

500,000

Mortgage taken subject to

(but not exceeding basis)
$ 12.000.000
Gross Profit

$ 12,500,000
-

Selling Price
Basis

500.000

$ 12,000,000
Gross Profit
Percentage

12,000,000

=

100%

12,000,000
Payment in year
of sale

$

2,500,000
+

200,000

Cash
Excess of mortgage over

Basis
$

2,700,000
-
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Taxable gain in
year of sale

$

2,700,000
1.00
x

$

2,700,.00

Payment
Gross profit percentage

The calculations with respect to the
wraparound note and mortgage are as follows:
Basis in wrap note

$

500,000

Basis in Value Land
Gain recognized in year
of sale
Cash received

+ 2,700,000
- 2,500,000

$
Gross profit in
wrap note

700,00

$ 10,000,000
-

$
Gross profit
percentage for
wrap note

Face amount
Basis

700.000

9.300.000
9.300,000
10,000,000

=

93%

(4) TP's contention is that the Original
Mortgage was neither assumed nor taken
subject to. Under this approach the
computations would be as follows:
Selling price

$ 12,500,000

Contract price

$ 12,500,000

Gross profit

$ 12,500,000

(no reduction for
Original Mortgage)
(selling price)
Basis

500,000

-

$ 12.000 000
Gross profit
Payments in year
of sale
Taxable gain in
year of sale

12,000,000
12,500,000
$

2,500,000

$

2,500,000
x

$

.96
2,400 000
-
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=

96%

(5) Comparison of timing of recognition of
gain:

Year

IRS Approach

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total Gain

$ 2,700,000
-01,860,000
1,860,000
1,860,000
1,860,000
1,860,000
$12,000,000

Taxpayer's
Approach
$ 2,400,000
-01,920,000
1,920,000
1,920,000
1,920,000
1,920.000
$12,000,000

3. Status of the law with respect to wraparound
mortgages. The tax treatment of wraparound
mortgages has, until recently, been an unsettled
issue.
a. Early conditional sale cases support
taxpayer's position. The Stonecrest Corp. v.
Commissioner, 24 T.C. 659 (1955), nonaca.,
1956-1 C.B. 6; Estate of Lambert v.
Commissioner, 31 T.C. 302 (1958), nonaca.,
1959-1 C.B. 6; and United Pacific Corp. v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 721 (1963).
b. Later cases involving purported wraparound
mortgages held for IRS, but in each instance
the Court sidestepped the principal issue and
held that, on the facts before it, the
purchaser had actually assumed or taken
subject to the pre-existing mortgage. See,
Voight v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 99 (1977),
aff'd per curiam, 614 F.2d 94 (5th Cir.
1980); Waldrep v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 640
(1969), aff'd per curiam, 428 F.2d 1216 (5th
Cir. 1970); and Goodman v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 684 (1980).
c. After passage of the Installment Sales Act, a
substantial portion of the installment
reporting rules was changed. The Service
took advantage of this situation and included
the anti-wraparound mortgage provision found
in Temp. Reg. S15A.453-1(b)(3)(ii) discussed
above. However, the Service's position in
this regard was suspect from the outset
-
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because the installment sale provisions added
by the Installment Sales Act did not alter
the rules regarding the computation of "gross
profit percentage." The Service's proposed
regulation, as it applies to wraparound
mortgages, has been criticized on several
grounds including the following:
(1) It utilizes two separate gross profit
percentages which seems to be taking
great liberties with the language in the
statute.
(2) There is an ambiguity in the Service's
definition of "qualifying indebtedness"
which may cause problems for real estate
developers who refinance a construction
loan with a permanent, "take out" loan.
(3) The definition of "wrapped indebtedness"
in the regulation is not clear. See,
Rosenkranz, "Voluntary Dispositions of
Real Estate: Sale of Principal
Residences: Dealer v. Investor, Current
Considerations; Installment Sales,
Including Wraparound Mortgages," 41 NYU
Inst. 23-1, 23-45 (1983).
(4) In Hunt v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1126
(1983), the Tax Court for the first time
dealt with a pure wraparound mortgage
(which did not involve a de facto
assumption or taking subject to as in
Voight and Goodman) and held for the
taxpayer. The Court held that the
Stonecrest line of cases, which involved
conditional sales, also applies to
wraparound mortgages. The facts of Hunt
pre-date the Installment Sales Act and
the Court specifically reserved judgment
on what impact, if any, the Service's
Temporary Regulation would have on its
decision if it were presented with
similar facts arising after 1980.
(5) In Professional Equities Corporation v.
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 165 (1987), the Tax
Court held that Temp. Reg. Sl5A.453l(b)(2)(ii) was invalid and was
inconsistent with the Stonecrest line of
cases. The Commissioner subsequently
announced his acquiescence in the
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Professional Equities decision. 1988-2
C.B. 1. However, it is important to note
that the court was not required to
specifically address the issue of
mortgage in excess of basis. In dicta
contained in footnote 17 of the opinion,
the court stated that it seemed
reasonable to treat mortgage in excess of
basis as a payment in the year of sale.
This comment appears inconsistent with
the Stonecrest line of cases and is also
inconsistent with Hunt in which the
balance of the underlying mortgages
exceeded the taxpayers' basis in the
property but the Tax Court did not
require the excess to be treated as a
payment in the year of sale.
(6) The holding in Professional Equities was
followed in Vincent E. Webb, 54 T.C.M.
443 (1987). However, despite its
acquiescence in Professional Equities and
the Tax Court's subsequent decision in
Webb, the Service continues to advise
taxpayers that they must treat the
underlying debt in a wraparound mortgage
as having been assumed or taken subject
to. See, IRS Pub. 537, "Installment
Sales" (issued for use in preparing 1989
tax returns). Moreover, in Robert E.
Kline, 57 T.C.M. 822 (1989), the Tax
Court followed its prior reasoning in
Goodman to strike down a purported
wraparound mortgage. The primary reason
cited by the Tax Court for its holding
(and as a basis for distinguishing
Professional Equities) was that the
payments on the wrap note in Kline were
required to be made to a collection agent
who was obligated to apply the payments
first in discharge of the underlying
mortgages and thereafter to the taxpayer.
Thus, in the view of at least one judge
of the Tax Court (Kline was a Memorandum
Decision) the use of a collection agent
to secure payment of the underlying
mortgages will be treated as a de facto
assumption or conveyance subject to the
underlying debt.

-
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H. Sales with contingencies.

1. Property owners who sell land to developers are
frequently torn between the desire to engage in
an outright sale of their property or to enter
into a joint venture with the developer/purchaser
to develop the property and obtain a greater
return. In an attempt to obtain the best of both
worlds, some sellers attempt to sell their
properties for a fixed price coupled with an
additional contingent price "kicker" equal to a
fixed or variable percentage of the proceeds
derived by the developer/purchaser from resale of
the land. There are a number of variations of
this approach. For example, the participation
interest might be payable from net profits
(rather than from net sales proceeds); it might
be subject to a ceiling (e.g., 25% of net sales
proceeds but not to exceed an aggregate amount of
$500,000); or the participation might terminate
or phase out over a specified period of years.
The objective of the seller in each of these
instances is to lock in a guaranteed minimum
selling price for his land while at the same time
participating in the upside potential from
subsequent development of the property. Equity
participation sales give rise to a number of tax
issues.
a. Sale versus partnership (or, alternatively,
part sale/part partnership).
b. If the transaction is treated as a sale, will
installment reporting be available for the
contingent portion of the purchase price?
c. If installment reporting is available, how
does the interest toll charge of §453A(a)(1)
apply to the contingent portion of the sales
price?
2. If the sale for a fixed price plus an equity
kicker is recognized as a sale for federal income
tax purposes, the application of the installment
reporting rules of §453 to the contingent portion
of the purchase price is governed by a special
set of rules.
a. Prior to Installment Sales Act, if a purchase
price was contingent, installment sale
reporting was not available but the seller
was entitled to recover basis against the
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first proceeds received. GralapD v.
Commissioner, 458 F.2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1972);
In Re Steen, 509 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1975).
The determination of whether the selling
price was contingent was to be made as of the
end of the taxable year in which the closing
took place. See, Rev. Rul. 76-109, 1976-1
C.B. 125.
b. The Installment Sales Act added §453(j) to
the Code which instructs the Treasury to
issue new regulations which, among other
things,

"

.

. . shall include regulations

providing for ratable basis recovery in
transactions where the gross profit or the
total contract price (or both) cannot be
readily ascertained." §453(j)(2).
(1) This determination is to be made at the
end of the taxable year of closing.
Temp. Reg. S15A.453-1(c)(1).
(2) If the contract is deemed to have a
"maximum stated selling price," the
selling price for purposes of §453 will
be deemed to be the maximum price payable
if all contingencies are met. If price
ultimately payable is less than this
amount, gross profit ratio will be
recomputed. Temp. Reg. §15A.4531(c)(2)(i)(A).
(3) If the selling price is not determinable
at the end of the taxable year of closing
(i.e., no maximum stated selling price)
but the maximum period over which
payments may be received is determinable,
the seller's basis (inclusive of selling
expenses) must be prorated evenly over
the maximum pay-out period. Temp. Reg.
If the payment in
§15A.453-1(c)(3)(i).
any taxable year is less than the basis
allocable for that year (or if no
payments are made in such year), no loss
will be allowed unless such year is the
final year of payment, and the basis
allocable to such year will be carried
forward to the next succeeding taxable
year. Id.
(4) If there is neither a maximum stated
selling price nor a fixed pay-out period,
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and if the transaction qualifies as a
sale for tax purposes, the seller's basis
will be recovered in equal annual
increments over a period of 15 years,
commencing with the taxable year in which
the closing takes place. Temp. Reg.
S15A.453-l(c)(4). If no payment is
received in a year, or if the payments
received are less than the basis
allocable to such year, no loss will be
allowed (unless the remaining debt is
determined to be worthless), but basis
will be carried over to the next
succeeding year.
(5) In each of these three instances
provision is made for alternative
treatment if the seller can establish to
the satisfaction of the Commissioner that
the general rule would substantially and
inappropriately defer recovery of the
seller's basis. See, Temp. Reg.
S15A.453-1(c)(7). The seller must apply
for and receive a ruling from the Service
prior to using an alternative method of
basis recovery. Temp. Reg. §15A.453l(c)(7)(ii).
c. §453A(a)(1) imposes an interest toll charge
upon the deferred tax liability inherent in
certain installment notes (see, discussion
under II.E. and F.). Will the toll charge be
levied not only with respect to the deferred
gain on the fixed portion of an installment
obligation but also on the contingent
portion? If so, will be deferred tax
liability be based upon the maximum stated
sales price? Cf. Temp. Reg. §15A.4531(c)(2)(i)(A). If the regulations ultimately
take this approach, will the taxpayer be able
to recoup part of the interest payable with
respect to the contingent portion if he
ultimately receives less than the maximum
amount due under the contingency?
Alternatively,- will a cumulative toll charge
be levied as payments under the participation
feature become fixed and determinable? The
legislative history of §453A suggests that
regulations be issued to deal with the
application of §453A to contingent price
sales (see, Conf. Rpt., Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987, 1987-3 C.B. 193,
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210), but no regulations have been proposed
as of the date of this outline.
d. In the case of a contingent price sale, even
if interest is payable regularly at a rate
which exceeds the applicable federal rate
with respect to the fixed portion of the
installment obligation, the absence of an
interest payment obligation applicable to the
contingent portion will result in original
issue discount ("OID").
See, generally,
5S1272 through 1275 In the case of a sale of
real estate, the installment obligation will
be deemed to have been issued for nonpublicly traded property and the rules of
Prop. Reg. Si.1275-4(c) will apply. Under
these rules, the non-contingent payments will
be separated from the contingent payments and
will be treated as two separate debt
instruments for purposes of applying the OID
rules. Prop. Reg. §1.1275-4(c)(1).
(1) The rules governing the contingent
payments due under the installment
obligation are found in Prop. Reg.
§1.1275-4(c)(3). Under this section, the
portion of each payment due under the
participation feature that is treated as
interest will be includable in the income
of the taxpayer, and will be treated as a
payment of interest by the purchaser, in
their respective taxable years when the
amount of the payment becomes fixed.
Prop. Reg. §1.1275-4(c)(3)(i). Each
payment under the participation feature
of the installment obligation will be
treated as consisting of: (a) a payment
of principal in an amount equal to the
present value of the payment, determined
by discounting such payment at the
applicable federal rate from the date the
payment becomes fixed to the issue date
of the note, and (b) the payment of
interest in an amount equal to the excess
of the total amount of such payment over
the amount treated as principal under (a)
above.
III. Options.
A. General. Options are frequently used in real estate
transactions as an alternative to a binding contract.
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The holder of the option ("optionee") desires to tie
up property for a given period of time for a fixed
price, but retain the flexibility to walk from the
deal if the circumstances are not right. In
addition, an option does not constitute a debt or
obligation of the optionee until exercised and, thus,
need not be reflected on the optionee's financial
statement as a liability. This can be a very
significant point in these days of highly restrictive
lending practices in the real estate industry. The
landowner/grantor of the option ("optionor") probably
would prefer a binding contract to sell the property
(but not always, as will be discussed below), but is
willing to grant an option to optionee in exchange
for a significant option payment. In most cases the
option payment will be applied against the purchase
price if exercised, but will be forfeited to the
optionor if the option lapses.
B. Rolling options. X owns a large tract of undeveloped
land consisting of approximately 4,000 acres which
has been in X's family for three generations. The
land is now ripe for development and X has received
several overtures from developers to acquire his
property for as much as $20,000,000. However, all
offers received thus far would have required X to
hold a substantial purchase money mortgage and to
subordinate to the purchaser's development loans. X
has been leery of these proposals both because of the
economic risks involved and because of the problems
associated with installment reporting after TRA '86.
Recently X received an innovative proposal from a
major developer ("developer") with a substantial net
worth and a proven track record. Developer has
offered to acquire X's property in a series of four
"rolling options." Under this approach, most of X's
property would be divided into four separate parcels
which would be designated as "Option Parcels 1
through 4." The balance of the property would be
earmarked for development into a golf course, tennis
courts, an entry way and a principal access road that
would service the entire property (the "Amenities
Properties").
Developer would initially pay X $1,000,000 as
consideration for an option to purchase Option Parcel
1 and the Amenities Properties for a total purchase
price of $5,000,000, which option would remain open
for a period of 18 months. The 18-month period is
designed to enable developer to pursue and obtain the
necessary permits and approvals from federal, state
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and local governmental agencies to develop the
property. If the option is exercised, the $1,000,000
option monies will be applied against the purchase
price for Option Parcel 1 and the Amenities
Properties. If the option lapses, the money would be
forfeited.
The purchase prices for Option Parcels 2 through 4
would also be agreed upon in advance as well as the
time and sequence that such options would be
exercisable. The prices would be negotiated and
would take into account the fact that X must hold
these properties off the market during the applicable
option periods and that the property would appreciate
in value both because of inflation and due to
development of the contiguous properties.
At the time of exercise of each of Option Parcels 1
through 3, developer would also be required to pay an
additional $500,000 to X as consideration for the
remaining options, which monies would also apply
against the purchase prices of such parcels if
exercised or would be forfeited if the options were
allowed to lapse. The purchase price for each Option
Parcel would be payable in cash at closing.
This proposal provides developer with downside
protection since he retains the ability to walk away
from the project at any time before fully exercising
all of his options and thereby limiting his
investment to the properties previously purchased
plus any forfeitable option monies paid for future
options. Developer has also been advised by his
accountants that any costs associated with future
options (i.e., options that have not yet been
exercised) need not be reflected as debts on his
balance sheet since there is no obligation for him to
pay these amounts until the options are exercised.
Although X is called upon to assume an additional
degree of economic risk under this proposal, there
are several aspects of the offer which appeal to him.
First, the total purchase price for X's properties
(consisting of the aggregate prices of Option Parcels
1 through 4 together with the Amenities Properties)
is significantly higher than the prices offered by
other developers which is attributable (in part) to
the fact that X will be required to hold his property
off the market for a substantial period of time.
Under developer's offer, X will be given the right to
approve all preliminary and final land plans as well
as overall development plans since these plans would
-
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impact the value of X's remaining properties if one
or more of the options are not exercised. Further,
even if developer allowed one or more options to
lapse, presumably the value of any property that X
would be left with would be enhanced in value by
reason of the development of the contiguous
properties. Finally, there are some significant tax
advantages to X inherent in this proposal which will
be discussed below.
1. Despite the fact that X will have unrestricted
use of the $1,000,000 of option monies from the
point in time that he receives them, he will not
be taxed on these monies until the options to
which they relate are either exercised or lapse.
See, Virginia Iron. Coal & Coke Co. v,
Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 195 (1938), aff'd, 99
F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1938), cert.denied, 307 U.S.
630; Commissioner v. Dill Co., 294 F.2d 291 (3rd
Cir. 1961); Kitchin v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 895
(4th Cir. 1965); Koch v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 71
(1976); and Hicks v. Commissioner, 37 CCH T.C.M.
1540 (1978). The reason behind these rulings is
that the taxability of the payments cannot be
determined until the options either lapse or are
exercised.
a. If an option is exercised and the option
monies are applied against the purchase
price, the monies will be treated as having
been received in a sale or exchange of the
option properties. S1234(a)(1); Temp. Reg.
§1.1234-1(a). Even if the option monies are
not applied against the purchase price, the
Tax Court in Koch v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 71
(1976) held that the same rule applies.
b. If the option lapses, the option monies must
be reported by the optionor (X in this case)
in his taxable year in which the lapse
occurred and such amounts would be ordinary
income. Temp. Reg. 51.1234-1(b); Rev.Rul.
57-40, 1957-1 C.B. 266.
2. If the rolling option transaction is properly
structured and constitutes a true series of
options (see, discussion under III.E.3. infra),
the installment sale provisions, including the
new interest toll charges and pledging rules
added by §453A, should not apply. Moreover, to
the extent that any depreciation recapture may be
inherent in the property under either §1245 or
-
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S1250, the acceleration of gain attributable to
this depreciation recapture under S453(i) would
also not apply.
3. Since X's property has been held by him for
investment purposes, all of the gain from the
sale of the property should be taxed as long term
capital gains. The Internal Revenue Service,
however, may argue that a portion of the option
prices should be re-characterized as ordinary
income on the grounds that disguised interest is
built into these option prices.
a. The Service has argued that option payments
are tantamount to interest and should be
taxed as such, but this position was rejected
by the Tax Court. See, Koch v. Commissioner,
67 T.C. 71 (1976).
b. The original issue discount rules of SS1271
through 1275 should not apply since a true
option contract would not constitute a "debt
instrument" as defined in S1275(a)(1). See,
In Koch, supra, the Tax Court
§1274(a).
found that an option contract does not
constitute a "debt" (67 T.C. at 82, 83), and
this rationale would also seem to negate the
presence of a "debt instrument."
C. Estate planning opportunities. If X is an
individual, the rolling option approach also presents
potential estate planning advantages in addition to
income tax advantages discussed above. For example,
if X's properties are acquired by the
developer/purchaser in a straight sale (as opposed to
a rolling option approach), X would receive an
installment note for a portion of the purchase price.
This installment note would be treated as "income in
respect of a decedent" ("IRD") under §691 upon the
subsequent death of the seller prior to the full
collection of the note. Thus, the seller's estate
would be required to pay estate taxes on the value of
the installment note and, most importantly, the
decedent's heirs would also inherit the decedent's
income tax liability with respect to the unpaid
balance of the installment note. See, S1014(c).
However, structuring the transaction as a series of
rolling options can eliminate the income tax problems
that the heirs would otherwise inherit. The
properties that are subject to options that have not
yet been exercised at the date of death will be
included in X's estate and the values will probably
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be tied, at least in part, to the option prices which
may eliminate the necessity of obtaining the
expensive appraisals for estate tax purposes. X's
heirs would also be entitled to a new "stepped-up
basis" under S1014 for the portions of the property
subject to the unexercised options which will enable
them to subsequently sell these properties if the
options are exercised without the necessity of paying
income taxes (because the sales prices will be
exactly equal to their tax bases).
D. Use of options to accomplish exchanges of property.
1. Reverse exchange. X wants to exchange his low
basis property ("relinquished property") for
other property ("replacement property") and defer
recognition of unrealized gain in the
relinquished property under 51031. X has
identified replacement property but does not yet
have a buyer for the relinquished property.
Owner of replacement property is unwilling to
hold it off the market until X has found a buyer
for X's relinquished property and insists that X
commit now to acquire the replacement property.
X does not want to commit to acquire the
replacement property without having located a
buyer for the relinquished property because if he
disposes of the relinquished property in a
taxable transaction he will not have sufficient
funds to acquire the replacement property. If X
acquires the replacement property prior to
disposing of his relinquished property the
disposition of his relinquished property will not
qualify for §1031 treatment even though, for
example, the purchaser of the relinquished
property pays the purchase price directly to the
seller of the replacement property.
a. The preamble to the recently promulgated
deferred exchange regulations states as
follows:
the Service has determined that
the deferred exchange rules of section
1031(a)(3) do not apply to reverseStarker transactions. However, the
Service will continue to study the
applicability of the general rule of
section 1031(a)(1) to those
transactions."

-
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b. X could buy an option to acquire the
replacement property, giving the owner of the
replacement property sufficient forfeitable
option consideration to induce him to keep
the replacement property off the market. The
option period will be set to allow X
sufficient time to find a buyer for his
relinquished property.
2. Deferred exchange. X has a.buyer for the
relinquished property, but has not yet located
replacement property. X is afraid the buyer will
walk if the deal is not finalized. Nevertheless,
when X transfers the relinquished property both
the 45-day identification period and the 180-day
exchange period of S1031(a)(3) begin to run. X
wants to preserve the deal with his buyer without
causing the time periods to commence. Thus,
rather than transferring the relinquished
property, X gives his buyer an option to purchase
it which would contain terms requiring the buyer
to cooperate with X in effecting a tax free
exchange.
E. When an option to acquire property is the tax
equivalent of an acquisition.
1. In each of the examples discussed in B, C, and D,
above, the optionor would prefer an outright sale
or a binding and specifically enforceable
contract, but in order to postpone realization
settles for an option. The optionor nevertheless
wants as much assurance as possible that the
option will be exercised and the sale will close.
Thus, in the case of the reverse exchange, X's
seller wants assurance that X will purchase the
replacement property. In the deferred exchange,
X wants assurance that the buyer of the
relinquished property will in fact buy it. In
the deferral until death, the heirs want
assurance that the buyer will buy the property
after X's death. In the rolling option case, the
optionor wants assurance that the developer will
take all of the property.
2. The option can contain a number of provisions to
give the optionor comfort as to the eventual
exercise in closing, including:
a. Requiring payment of a large amount (relative
to the value of the property-) of forfeitable
option consideration.
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b. Encouraging exercise in the case of the
rolling option by setting uniform option
prices for the various parcels, but requiring
the optionee to take down the less valuable
parcels first.
c. Encouraging exercise by requiring the
optionee to first buy a land locked portion
of the property and requiring him to
construct an access road or extend utilities
to that portion, thus benefitting the
remaining parcel if he fails to exercise the
entire option.
The question is, of course, how far can you go
toward assuring exercise of the option and the
closing of the acquisition of the property.
3. Framework for analysis.
a. §1001. The issue in the case of the rolling
option, reverse exchange and deferred
exchange is whether the granting of the
option is in substance the "sale or
disposition" of the underlying property
pursuant to 51001. In cases in which the
parties purposefully cast their transaction
in such a form so as to avoid a "sale or
disposition," the touchstone for analysis is
whether sufficient benefits and burdens of
ownership have passed so that the transaction
is in substance a sale or disposition.
b. The issue in connection with the discussion
of the estate planning opportunities is
whether at the date of death of the optionor
the remaining purchase price with respect to
the option property constituted "amounts to
which a decedent was entitled as gross income
but which were not properly includable in
computing his taxable income for the taxable
year ending with the date. of his death or for
a previous taxable year under the method of
accounting employed by the decedent."
Reg.
51.691(a)-l(b).
4. Guidelines for structuring options and avoiding
realization.
a. It is abundantly clear that the granting of
an option, nothing else appearing, is not a
sale or other disposition of the underlying
- 30 -

property pursuant to S1001. Helvering v. San
Joaauin Fruit and Investment Co., 197 U.S.
496 (1936); Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265
(CBOE puts and calls); Rev. Rul. 84-121,
1984-2 C.B. 168 (premature disposition under
§1031 with option consideration equal to 5%
of fair market value on option date granted).
b. It is less clear, but almost certainly the
case, that the mere granting of an option by
the decedent prior to death, which was
unexecuted at death, does not give rise to
IRD upon the post-death exercise of and
closing on the option. Acker, "Income in
Respect of a Decedent," 32-3rd Tax Mam't
Portfolio A-34. However, if the decedent
entered into a contract to sell the property
prior to death, at the time of death most of
the material conditions to the closing have
been satisfied, the post-death closing of the
contract will result in IRD. This may be
true even if the contract was a liquidated
damages contract not specifically enforceable
by the decedent or his estate and thus the
economic equivalent of an option. Trust Co.
of George v. Ross, 393 F.2d 694 (5th Cir.
1967).
c. Despite the general rules of a. and b. above,
only the most naive would take complete
comfort that realization or IRD does not
arise merely because of the labeling of the
transaction as an option. Thus, for example,
if an owner of raw land granted a currently
exercisable, freely transferable, recordable
option to an optionee in exchange for option
consideration equal to 100% of the fair
market value of the raw land which
consideration would be forfeited if the
optionee did not exercise and close and which
option consideration would be applied in full
satisfaction of the purchase price if the
optionee elected to close, the owner will
most certainly be viewed as having sold the
land when the option was granted.
d. The analysis under §001 is generally to
determine whether sufficient "benefits and
burdens" have passed, while the analysis
under §691 is generally whether the decedent
had a right or entitlement to the income.
Clearly the "entitlement" analysis is
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different from, and much looser than, a
constructive receipt analysis or merely
determining that the decedent had the legal
right to demand the income. IRD, by
definition, can only arise if there was no
realization of income prior to death. Thus,
IRD can arise only if the decedent was not in
constructive receipt and only if the benefits
and burdens did not pass prior to death.
Thus, if the rights that decedent had at the
time of death do not give rise to IRD, then a
fortiori those rights should not give rise to
S1001 sale or exchange treatment. In other
words, if under the IRD cases the decedent
did not have sufficient entitlement at his
death to cause the post-death closing to
result in IRD, then one can rest assured that
these rights are not sufficient to trigger
51001 realization.
e. In the case of a currently exercisable,
freely transferrable, recordable option the
optionee has all of the economic benefits of
ownership except current possession, and he
can obtain current possession merely for the
asking. Thus, the principal focus in
analyzing options under SI001 should be the
extent to which the optionor can transfer the
burdens of ownership to the optionee without
economically triggering a "sale or
disposition." Economically, the burdens of
ownership would consist of the current outof-pocket carrying costs (taxes and
insurance) and, probably much more
importantly, the risk of decline in fair
market value between the option is granted
and the time of closing.
Another burden of the ownership of legal
title or possession, but less acceptable to
economic analysis, would be environmental
liability. However, presumably before an
optionee would place forfeitable option
consideration at risk the optionee would have
convinced himself that the exposure was
small, or if the property did not pass an
environmental audit that the option
consideration would be returned.
The optionee receives or assumes burdens of
ownership to the extent he pays consideration
for the option that will be forfeited if he
-
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fails to close. Whether or not the option
consideration is credited toward the purchase
price if closing does occur is irrelevant in
this analysis, because regardless of what the
option agreement says, the option
consideration is, in economic effect, part of
the purchase price.
f. Based upon Rev. Rul. 84-121, supra, it would
seem that forfeitable option consideration
equal to or less than 5% of the fair market
value of the underlying property on the date
the option is granted is "safe." Based upon
common sense, forfeitable option
consideration equal to 100% of the fair
market value will result in a current sale
for tax purposes.
g. In addition to forfeitable option
consideration paid in cash, the analysis must
include the value of other inducements
flowing from the optionee to the optionor,
such as those described in III.E.2. above.
h. Based upon the foregoing, a reasonable
framework for analysis of the §1001 sale or
disposition issue would be to compare the
ratio of forfeitable option consideration
plus the fair market value of other
consideration flowing from the optionee to
the optionor to the fair market value of the
underlying property. The greater the ratio,
the greater the burdens of ownership that
have passed to the optionee and the greater
the corresponding risk that the option is the
equivalent of a "sale or disposition."
i. Post-grant, but pre-closing, occurrences that
are within the control of the parties should
also be relevant. If, for example, the
optionee is required to post additional
forfeitable option consideration during the
option period, the ratio would have to be reexamined at that time based upon the then
fair market values. Perhaps closing on one
piece of a rolling option should also trigger
re-examination of the ratio based upon the
remaining option consideration and the then
values. Nevertheless, the mere post-grant,
pre-closing decrease in fair market value of
the underlying property, which would increase
the ratio and mean at that point in time the
-
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optionee has a greater percentage of the
burdens of ownership, should not result in a
de facto sale. How high the allowable ratio
should go will presumably depend upon how
susceptible the underlying property is to
post-grant decreases in value. For example,
the value of raw land might depend on
rezoning or a new highway which, in the
absence of other circumstances, should result
in a higher allowable ratio than would (for
example) improved real property which is 100%
leased to credit where the tenants on a long
term basis.
IV. Like Kind Exchanges of Real Properties.
A. Overview. Section 1031 provides an exception to the
general rule of 51001(c) that gains or losses arising
from the sale or exchange of property are to be
recognized for tax purposes. Nonrecognition of gain
or loss is provided for under §1031 in the case of
exchanges of "like kind properties" (other than
stocks, securities, partnership interests and similar
properties, and other than "dealer properties" and
properties held primarily for sale) which are held
for productive use in a trade or business or for
investment. 51031(a)(1) and (2).
Section 1031 is
frequently employed in real estate transactions,
although its use is not confined to real property, in
order to defer taxes on disposition. If a taxpayer
sells property at a gain, his ability to acquire
replacement property is limited because he has only
net, after-tax proceeds to reinvest. On the other
hand, if the taxpayer can arrange to effect a
qualifying exchange of properties under S1031 he is
able to acquire replacement properties utilizing the
full purchasing power of pre-tax dollars. Moreover,
the recent increases in the capital gains rates
coupled with the lengthening of depreciation periods
for real property have perhaps made tax deferral
under 51031 even more valuable than before.
1. Section 1031 is a deferral provision. Just as in
the case of most deferral provisions under the
Code, 51031(d) exacts a price for nonrecognition
of gain in the form of a basis adjustment. See,
discussion under IV.C.5., below.
2. The provisions of §1031 are not elective. If the
conditions of §1031 are met, nonrecognition is
mandated which sometimes catches unwary taxpayers
when a loss rather than a gain is realized in the
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transaction. §1031(c); see, United States v.
Vardine, 305 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1962).
B. Legislative history.
1. Pre-1921 law. Prior to 1921 all exchanges of
tangible properties, even though they were of
"like kind," were treated as taxable
transactions. Revenue Act of 1918, S202(b).
2. Statutory predecessors of §1031. The Revenue Act
of 1921 created a special nonrecognition rule for
exchanges of property not having a "readily
realizable market value." Moreover, even if such
property had such an ascertainable market value,
nonrecognition treatment was still accorded if
the property acquired was of "like kind or use"
to the property relinquished and if the
relinquished property was held

".

. . for

investment, or for productive use in trade or
business (not including stock in trade or other
property held primarily for sale) . . . "
Revenue Act of 1921, §202(c). In 1923 the
statute was amended to preclude the availability
of nonrecognition treatment for exchanges of
stock and securities and in 1924 it was further
amended to delete the "readily realizable market
value" provision.
3. Legislative intent. One court has focused on the
"readily realizable market value" standard
originally incorporated in the 1921 edition of
the statute and determined that the underlying
legislative rationale for nonrecognition was to
avoid administrative difficulties in valuing
properties for the purposes of computing gain or
loss. Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 192
F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 954 (1952). However, the better view seems
to be that the statute was intended to provide
nonrecognition in instances where the taxpayer
continues his investment in essentially the same
kind of property as the property disposed of and
his gain or loss is merely "theoretical." H.R.
Rept. No. 704, Revenue Act of 1934, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess., 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 554, 564; Jordan Marsh
Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir.
1959).
a. Reg. §1.1002-1(b) provides that §1031 is to
be strictly construed and should not be
extended beyond its specific provisions and
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underlying purposes. However, the validity
of this regulation's interpretation of the
scope of S1031 was directly questioned in
Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th
Cir. 1979).
C. Statutory requirements and mechanics of 91031
1. General rule.
follows:

Section 1031(a)(1) provides as

No gain or loss shall be recognized on the
exchange of property held for productive use
in a trade or business or for investment if
such property is exchanged solely for
property of like kind which is to be held
either for productive use in a trade or
business or for investment.
2. Exceptions.
follows:

Section 1031(a)(2) provides as

This subsection shall not apply to any
exchange of (A) stock in trade or other
property held primarily for sale, (B) stocks,
bonds or notes, (C) other securities or
evidences of indebtedness or interest, (D)
interests in a partnership, (E) certificates
of trust or beneficial interests, or (F)
choses in action.
3. Essential elements of an exchange qualifying for
nonrecognition treatment under S1031.
a. Property. Only certain types of "property"
are eligible for nonrecognition treatment
under S1031.
(1) The properties must be of a "like kind"
as discussed in IV.C.3.d., below.
(2) The properties may not be ". . . stock in

trade or other property held primarily
for sale, stocks, bonds, or notes, other
securities or evidences of indebtedness
or interest, interests in a partnership,
certificates of trust or beneficial
interests, or choses in action."
§1031(a)(2).
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(a) "Stock in trade" -- Gulfstream Land &

Development Corp. v. Commissioner, 71
T.C. 587 (1979).
(b) "Property held primarily for sale" -Bernard v. Commissioner, 26 CCH
T.C.M. 858 (1967); Griffin v.
Commissioner, 49 T.C. 253 (1967); and
Klarkowski v. Commissioner, 24 CCH
T.C.M. 1827 (1965), aff'd on another
issue, 385 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1967).
Note that 51031(a)(2)(A) excludes
"property held primarily for sale" as
contrasted with S§1221(1) and
1231(b)(1)(B) which exclude property
held "primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of a trade or
business." See, Black v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C. 90 (1960) in
which the court stated that the "held
for sale" test of §1031 is narrower
than that contained in S1221(l), but
did not elaborate on the practical
effect of the difference.
(c) "Choses in action" -- Gulfstream Land

& Development Corp. v. Commissioner,
71 T.C. 587 (1979); Estate of Meyer
v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311 (1972),
aff'd per curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th
Cir. 1974).
(d) "Certificates of trust or beneficial
interest" -- Rutland v. Commissioner,

36 T.C.M. 40 (1977).
(e) "Partnership interest"

--

i) Prior to the enactment of
S1031(a)(2)(D) by TRA '84, the
Service and the Tax Court
disagreed as to whether an
exchange of partnership interests
qualified for nonrecognition
treatment under §1031. In Estate
of Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.
311 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 503
F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974),
nonacq., 1975-1 C.B. 3, the
Service argued that partnership
interests could not be exchanged
tax-free under S1031 because
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partnership interests constituted
choses in action which were
specifically excluded from §1031
by the parenthetical clause of
S1031(a) prior to its amendment
by T.R.A. '84. The Tax Court
rejected this argument and held
that the exchange of general
partnership interests in
different partnerships with

similar assets fell within the
purview of S1031. However, the
Tax Court did find that the
exchange of a general partnership
interest for a limited partnership interest did not qualify for
nonrecognition treatment under
§1031 despite the similarity of
the underlying assets of the
partnerships involved.
ii) Despite its defeat in Estate of
Meyer, the Service continued to
take the position that exchanges
of partnership interests did not
fall within §1031, and in Rev.
Rul. 78-135, 1978-1 C.B. 256, the
Service ruled that an exchange of
general partnership interests
would not qualify under §1031.
iii) The Tax Court again rejected the
Service's position and reaffirmed
its own position in Gulfstream
Land & Development Corp. v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587 (1979).
See, also, Long v. Commissioner,
77 T.C. 1045 (1981) (exchange of
50% interest in general
partnerships with real estate as
the underlying assets qualified
under §1031), and Pappas v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078 (1982)
(exchange of general partnership
interests qualified as a like
kind exchange under §1031).
iv) Despite the position taken by the
Tax Court, TRA '84 rejected the

Tax Court's position and codified
the Service's position taken in
Rev. Rul. 78-135 that exchanges
-
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of partnership interests are
excluded from §1031.
S1031(a)(2)(D). However, the
House Committee Report makes it
clear that S1031(a)(2)(D)
excludes only exchanges of
interests in different
partnerships, so that partnership
interests in the same partnership
may be exchanged tax-free under
§1031. H.R. Rep. No. 98-432,
98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1231-1234
(1984). Query, whether an
exchange of a limited partnership
interest for a general
partnership interest in the same
partnership will qualify under
§1031. Though the House
Committee Report language
arguably covers this situation,
Estate of Meyer, supra, would
seem to indicate to the contrary.
v) The Service's position on
exchanges of a limited
partnership interest for a
general partnership interest of
the same partnership is set forth
in Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B.
157. Rather than treating the
transaction as an exchange, Rev.
Rul. 84-52 analyzes such a
transaction as a distribution of
a new partnership interest to the
converting partner or partners in
exchange for a contribution of
their old interests to the
partnership under §721.
Consequently, under the Service's
view, a partner converting his
general partnership interest into
a limited partnership interest
(or vice versa) in the same
partnership will recognize no
gain or loss on such conversion
unless there is a reduction in
such partner's share of
partnership liabilities under
§752 such that the deemed
distribution of money to the
converting partner under S752(b)
exceeds such partner's adjusted
-
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basis in his partnership
interest. S731(a)(1).
vi) The Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1990 (the "1990 Act") amended
S1031(a)(2) by providing that an
interest in a partnership which
has properly elected under
S761(a) to be excluded from
Subchapter K (containing the
primary provisions relating to
taxation of partnerships and
partners) will be treated as an
interest in each of the underlying assets of the partnership.
See, also, Reg. S1.1031(a)1(a)(1). This may facilitate the
exchange of interests in a real
estate partnership. However, the
election under 5761(a) is only
available for real estate partnerships if they are holding real
property for investment purposes
and not for the conduct of an
active trade or business with
respect to the real property.
For discussion of the opportunities and limitations associated
with the use of S761(a) in conjunction with S1031, see, Weller,
"1990 Legislation Offers Expanded
Possibilities for Exchanges of
Real Estate Partnership
Interests," The Real Estate Tax
Digest, 29-44 (Feb. 1991).
(3) The interest must constitute "property"
and not a right to income. Compare
Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, 356 U.S. 260
(1958) (mineral rights in the form of
carved out oil payment did not constitute
"property" for purposes of S1031), with
Commissioner v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181
(5th Cir. 1941), and Rev. Rul. 68-331,
1968-1 C.B. 352 (undivided oil interests
and overriding royalties qualified as
"property"). Under Reg. §1.1031(a)-l(c),
a leasehold interest with 30 years or
more to run is considered as "property,"
but see, Pembroke v. Commissioner, 70
F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1934) and Rev. Rul.
66-209, 1966-2 C.B. 299 which hold that
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if a fee owner merely carves out a 30year leasehold interest from his fee
ownership and exchanges it for real
property, the leasehold interest will not
be treated as property because it will be
more in the nature of an assignment of
income such as that found in P. G. Lake,
supra.
b. Properties must be held for productive use in
trade or business or for investment. The
regulations under §1031 neither define "held
for productive use in trade or business" nor
"investment." However, for useful analogies
see, S§1231 and 167 regarding trade or
business properties and §1221 regarding
investment properties.
(1) Property held for productive use in a
trade or business may be exchanged for
property to be held for investment or
vice versa. Reg. §l.1031(a)-(1)(a).
(2) The properties must be held for
productive use in a trade or business or
held for investment. Thus, if property
which would otherwise qualify under §1031
is promptly disposed of in a taxable
transaction, it will not be eligible
because it is not held for the required
purpose. See, Black v. Commissioner, 35
T.C. 90 (1960).
(a) The Service has also taken the
position that if property received in
an exchange which would otherwise
qualify under §1031 is promptly
disposed of in a non-taxable
transaction, such property will not
be eligible for §1031 treatment
because it was not "held" for the
required purposes. See, e.g., Rev.
Rul. 75-292, 1975-.2 C.B. 333
(property received in a purported
§1031 exchange immediately
transferred to a controlled
corporation under §351 ineligible for
51031 nonrecognition treatment).
(b) The Tax Court in Wagenson v.
Commissioner, 75 T.C. 653 (1980) held
that an exchange followed by a gift
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of the replacement property within
nine months of the exchange did not
violate the "holding" requirement.
However, in Click v. Commissioner, 78
T.C. 223 (1982), the Tax Court struck
down a purported S1031 exchange
because it found that the taxpayer
had intended as of the time of the
exchange to give away the replacement
property (and did so within 7 months
thereafter).
(c) In Magneson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C.
767 (1983), aff'd 753 F.2d 1490 (9th
Cir. 1985), the Tax Court found that
a prearranged transfer of real
property received in a like kind
exchange to a partnership in return
for an interest in the partnership
satisfied the holding requirement of
S1031(a). The court's holding was
limited to those situations in which
a taxpayer exchanges property for
like kind property with the intent to
contribute it to a partnership for a
general partnership interest.
i) The court distinguished Rev. Rul.
75-292, supra, on the following
(1) a corporation is an
grounds:
entity separate and apart from
its shareholders while a
partnership is an association of
the partners making up the
partnership and (2)a like kind
exchange in conjunction with an
§351 transfer "viewed as a whole"
results in the exchange of
property for stock, a transaction
expressly excluded from §1031.
ii) Continued reliance on the
Magneson decision, however, is
uncertain in light of the
enactment of S1031(a)(2)(D) by
TRA '84. Section 1031(a)(2)(D)
expressly excludes a partnership
interest as like kind property.
(d) See, also, Bolker v. Commissioner, 81
T.C. 782 (1983), aff'd, 85-1 U.S.T.C.
9400 (9th Cir. 1985), which held
-
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that an exchange of real property
received in an S333 tax-free
liquidation for like kind property
qualified under 51031(a). The court
found that whether an exchange of
like kind property is preceded by, or
succeeded by, a tax-free acquisition
or transfer of property should not
affect nonrecognition treatment under
51031(a).
i) However, the Ninth Circuit
emphasized that the taxpayer had
decided to exchange the property
only after the adoption of the
plan of liquidation, thus
implying that a different result
might have followed if the intent
to exchange predated the adoption
of the liquidation plan.
ii) For the Service's view (contrary
to Bolker) on similar facts, see,
Rev. Rul. 77-337, 1977-2 C.B.
305.
(e) Mason v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. 1134
(1988) sanctioned an exchange of real
property which was received by the
taxpayer as a distribution from a
partnership in which the taxpayer was
a partner. The opinion contains very
little analysis of the applicable
issues and, as a memorandum decision,
has little precedential value.
(f) See, also, Maloney v. Commissioner,
93 T.C. 89 (1989), in which the Tax
Court upheld the application of §1031
to an exchange of real properties by
a corporation on December 28, 1978,
which was followed four days later by
the transfer of the replacement
property to the corporation's
shareholders pursuant to an §333
liquidation. The Tax Court
emphasized the continuity of
investment by the corporation's
shareholders and ignored the fact
that the corporation clearly intended
to liquidate and distribute the
replacement property it received in
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the exchange even as the exchange was
being negotiated and consummated.
But see, Chase v. Commissioner, 92
T.C. 874 (1989), which involved a
case in which the taxpayer did
everything wrong resulting in a win
for the Service.
(g) Proposals were advanced by both
Treasury and Chairman Rostenkowski of
the House Ways and Means Committee
that would have effectively repealed
Bolker, Magneson, and Maloney in
connection with the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1989 by
requiring that the taxpayer hold both
the property exchanged and the
replacement property for at least one
year. However, these proposals were
dropped prior to enactment of the
final Bill.
c. Exchange. Section 1031(a) specifically
limits its application to exchanges (as
opposed to sales or other forms of
disposition) of property. While the presence
or absence of an exchange would normally be
self-evident, the issue may become obscured
in the case of multi-party exchanges
discussed in IV.D. and E., below. Moreover,
even though the parties may have clearly
contemplated an exchange, if they attempt to
short cut the formalities of an exchange,
especially in the case of three-cornered
exchanges (see, discussion in IV.D., below),
the result may be a sale rather than an
exchange. Bezdjian v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d
217 (9th Cir. 1988); Carlton v. United
States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967); Swaim
v. United States, 81-2 U.S.T.C. 19575 (5th
Cir. 1981); Rogers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.
126 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 377 F.2d 534
(9th Cir. 1967).
d. Like kind. The regulations adopt a liberal
construction of "like kind" for purposes of
applying the nonrecognition rules:
. . . The words 'like kind' have
reference to the nature or character of
the property and not to its grade or
quality. . . The fact that any real
-
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estate involved is improved or unimproved
is not material, for that fact relates
only to the grade or quality of the
property and not to its kind or class.
Reg. §1.1031(a)-l(b).
In the case of real estate, as noted in the
above quoted portion of the regulations,
improved real estate may be exchanged for
unimproved real estate, and city real estate
may be exchanged for a ranch or farm. Reg.
S1.1031(a)-1(c). Similarly, a leasehold
interest with 30 years or more to run may, if
it represents the taxpayer's entire interest
in the property (see, discussion under
"Property" in IV.C.3.a., supra) be exchanged
for a fee interest in real property. Reg.
S1.1031(a)-l(c). An undivided interest as a
tenant in common may also be exchanged for a
fee title. Rev. Rul. 73-476, 1973-2 C.B.
300.
(1) The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989
added new §1031(h) which provides the
U.S. real property will not be deemed to
be "like kind" with real property located
outside of the U.S.
4. Boot. The general rule for nonrecognition
treatment set forth in S1031(a) requires that
qualifying property must be exchanged solely for
other qualifying property. However, §1031(b)
provides that if an exchange would otherwise be
eligible for tax free exchange treatment under
91031(a) but for the presence of some
nonqualifying property ("boot"), any gain
realized in the transaction (i.e., economic gain)
will be recognized for tax purposes to the extent
of the sum of money and fair market value of the
nonqualifying property received. If the exchange
results in a realized loss (i.e., economic loss)
and boot is received, §1031(c) provides that the
loss will not be recognized.
a. Example of operation of "boot" rule. TP, who
owns TP Land with a fair market value of
$100,000 and a tax basis of $50,000, enters
into an exchange with X who owns X Land with
a fair market value of $80,000. X transfers
X Land to TP plus $20,000 in exchange for TP
Land. TP's realized gain will be computed as
follows:
-
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$ 80,000
+20.000
$100,000
-50.000
$ 50,000

Fair market value of X Land received
Cash received
Total consideration
Basis in TP Land transferred
Realized gain

Under §1031(b), $20,000 of TP's total realized
gain of $50,000 must be recognized (i.e.,
reported for tax purposes) due to the receipt
of $20,000 of boot (cash) by TP.
b. Three forms of boot. "Boot" can be received in
three different forms.
(1) Cash
(2) Nonqualifying property
(a) Property which is not "like kind."
51031(a)(1).
(b) Property which is not held for
productive use in a trade or business
or for investment. §1031(a)(1).
(c) Stock in trade or other property held
primarily for sale, stocks, bonds, or
notes, other securities or evidences of
indebtedness or interest, interests in
a partnership, certificates of trust or
beneficial interests, or choses in
action. §1031(a)(2).
(3) Relief from liabilities either through
assumption of such liabilities by the other
party to the exchange or by a conveyance of
property to the other party subject to an
existing liability and mortgage. Reg.
§1.1031(b)-i(c).
c. Netting of boot. In many exchanges a taxpayer
will both give and receive boot. In such
instances the regulations tolerate some
"netting" of boot.
(1) Under Reg. §1.1031(b)-l(c), liabilities of
the taxpayer encumbering his property which
are either assumed or taken subject to by
the other party to the exchange may be
offset, or "netted," against liabilities
encumbering the other party's property
which are either assumed or taken subject
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to by the taxpayer in the exchange.
Although not specifically stated in the
statute, Reg. Si.1031(d)-2, Ex.2, makes it
clear that if the taxpayer assumes or takes
property subject to existing debt such debt
will reduce the amount of gain realized.
(2) Liabilities of the taxpayer encumbering his
property which are assumed or taken subject
to by the other party to the exchange may
also be offset by cash given by the
taxpayer to such other party. Reg.
§1.1031(d)-2, Exs. 1 and 2; Barker v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555 (1980.
Query,
may nonqualifying property given by the
taxpayer also be netted against mortgage
indebtedness of the taxpayer which is
assumed or taken subject to by the other
party to the exchange? Dicta in the Tax
Court's Barker decision suggests that it
may. 74 T.C. 555 (1980).
See, also, Ltr.
Rul. 8003004 (Sept. 19, 1979).
The
issuance of a promissory note by the
taxpayer as partial consideration for the
replacement property will be treated as
boot. Rev. Rul. 79-44, 1979-1 C.B. 265.
Query also whether such a note may be
netted against the taxpayer's liabilities
which are assumed or taken subject to in
the exchange.
(3) A taxpayer who receives cash or
nonqualifying property to compensate for a
difference in net values in the properties
(fair market value less mortgage) cannot
offset such boot by boot given in the form
of assumption of debt by the taxpayer
encumbering the property received (or
taking subject to such debt).
Reg.
§1.1031(d)-2, Ex. 2; Barker:, Coleman v.
Commissioner, 180 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1950).
This rule is apparently predicated upon the
assumption that the taxpayer receiving the
cash or other nonqualifying property is
free to use it for whatever purposes he
desires and is not necessarily required to
apply it in reduction of the "excess"
mortgage indebtedness assumed.
(a) Query, in an effort to avoid receiving
cash, may be taxpayer and the other
party to the exchange agree that the
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taxpayer will refinance his mortgage to
the level necessary to eliminate the
necessity of receiving cash from the
other party? If this is done in
anticipation of the exchange, the
additional debt so created may
nevertheless be treated as a cash
payment. Cf. Shubin v. Commissioner,
67 F.2d 199 (3rd Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 291 U.S .664 (1933); Rev. Rul.
73-555, 1973-2 C.B. 159 involving the
impact of mortgaging property
immediately prior to sale on "payments
received in the year of sale" under
§453 (installment sales provisions);
and Ltr. Rul. 8434015 (pre-exchange
borrowing treated as cash received in
exchange). But see, 124 Front Street.
Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 6 (1975),
acq., 1976-2 C.B. 2, nonacg., 1976-2
C.B. 3; and Garcia v. Commissioner, 80
T.C. 491 (1983) (increase of mortgage
on property to be received in like kind
exchange as precondition to exchange in
order to avoid recognition of boot gain
due to relief of liability on property
given up respected as legitimate debt).
Cf. also Temp. Reg. S15A.453l(b)(2)(iv), in defining "qualified
indebtedness" for installment reporting
purposes, which would treat any related
pre-sale borrowing as a cash payment in
connection with the sale.
(b) Query, also, whether the other party to
the exchange may reduce the level of
his indebtedness to eliminate the
payment of cash? See, Garcia, supra.
(c) A legitimate method of minimizing or
eliminating the receipt of boot is to
have the other party to the exchange
construct desired improvements on the
property to be received by the taxpayer
in the exchange with the monies that
would otherwise have been paid as boot.
See, Coastal Terminals. Inc. v. United
States. 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963);
and J.H. Baird Publishing Co. v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608 (1962), aca.,
1963-2 C.B. 4.
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(4) Example of effects of boot netting rule
(adapted from Reg. S1.1031(d)-2, Ex. 2).
TP owns the TP apartment house. On June
15, 1992, the TP apartment house has an
adjusted tax basis in TP's hands of
$100,000, a fair market value of $200,000
and is subject to a mortgage of $80,000.
Thus, the net fair market value of the TP
apartment house on June 15, 1992, is as
follows:
$220,000
-80,000
$140,000

Fair market value
Mortgage
Net fair market value

X owns the X apartment house which on June
15, 1992, has an adjusted tax basis in X's
hands of $175,000, a fair market value of
$250,000 and is subject to a mortgage of
$150,000. Thus, the net fair market value
of the X apartment house on June 15, 1992,
is as follows:
$250,000
-150.000
$100,000

Fair market value
Mortgage
Net fair market value

On June 15, 1992, TP and X exchange the TP
apartment house for the X apartment house.
Since the TP apartment house has a net fair
market value $40,000 greater than the X
apartment house, X pays TP $40,000 in cash
at closing. Each apartment house is
transferred subject to the existing
indebtedness which is assumed by the
parties. The tax treatment of TP and X is
as follows:
(a) Tax treatment of TP:
$250,000
+

80,000

Fair market value of X
apartment house received
Mortgage on TP apartment
house assumed by X

+ 40,000

Cash

$370,000
-100,000

Total consideration received
Adjusted tax basis in
TP apartment house
Mortgage on X apartment
house assumed by TP
Net realized gain

-150,000
$120,000
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For purposes of §1031(b), the amount of
net boot received by TP is $40,000 and,
thus, $40,000 of TP's realized gain
must be recognized for tax purposes.
This figure was computed by netting
$80,000 of the $150,000 mortgage
assumed by TP against the $80,000
mortgage encumbering the TP apartment
house assumed by X. However, although
TP assumed $70,000 more indebtedness of
X ($150,000 minus $80,000), this excess
may not be offset against the $40,000
of cash boot received by TP.
(b) Tax treatment of X:
$220,000
+150.000
$370,000
-175,000
- 80,000

Fair market value of TP
apartment house received
Mortgage on X apartment
house assumed by TP
Total consideration received
Adjusted tax basis in X
apartment house
Mortgage on TP apartment

house assumed by X
- 40,000

Cash paid by X

$ 75,000

Net realized gain

For purposes of S1031(b), the amount of
net boot received by X is $30,000 with
the result that $30,000 of X's realized
gain must be recognized for tax
purposes. X received boot in the
amount of $150,000 by virtue of TP's
assumption of the mortgage on the X
apartment house, but X was entitled to
offset this by both the $80,000
mortgage assumed by X on the TP
apartment house and the $40,000 in cash
paid by X to TP.
d. Installment reporting of recognized gains.
Prior to the Installment Sales Act, it was
difficult to qualify for installment reporting
of the taxpayer's gain resulting from the
receipt of boot in the form of an installment
note because the receipt of qualifying property
was treated as a "payment in the year of sale"
for purposes of the 30% test under
§453(b)(2)(A) prior to its amendment by the
Installment Sales Act. Mitchell v.
Commissioner, 42 T.C. 953 (1964), aca., 1965-2
- 50 -

C.B. 6. However, under current s453(f)(6)(C),
"payments" do not include qualifying properties
received in an §1031 exchange and installment
obligations are not taxed in the year of
receipt. Thus, if a taxpayer wishes to spread
his recognized gain attributable to boot
received in an §1031 exchange, he may negotiate
for receipt of an installment note from the
other party in lieu of cash or other
nonqualifying property. In addition, the total
contract price will be reduced for the amount
of nonrecognition property received in the
exchange under §453(f)(6)(A), and the gross
profit is reduced for any realized gain that
will not be recognized due to §1031 under
S453(f)(6)(B). For purposes of reporting the
taxpayer's taxable gain upon receipt of
installment payments in an §1031 transaction,
the taxpayer's basis will first be allocated to
qualifying property received to the extent of
its fair market value with the excess (if any)
being applied against the installment payments.
See, Prop. Reg. §1.453-1(f)(1)(iii). Thus, the
taxpayer will not have any basis in the
installment note unless the basis in his
relinquished property is greater than the value
of his replacement property.
5. Basis and holding periods. Section 1031 is a
deferral provision. Like most deferral provisions
in the Code, it exacts a price for nonrecognition
in the form of a reduction in basis in qualifying
property received in an §1031 exchange.
a. General rule. Section 1031(d) provides that
the basis of qualifying (like kind) property
received in an §1031 exchange is equal to the
basis of the property transferred, reduced by
any cash received and any loss recognized
(which would be attributable to exchange of
"boot properties"), and increased by any gain
recognized.
(1) The basis of property received by a
taxpayer in an S1031 exchange may also be
increased by the amount of any cash paid by
the taxpayer. Reg. §1.1031(d)-2, Ex. 2.
Broker's commissions paid by the taxpayer
will also increase the taxpayer's basis in
the newly acquired property. Rev. Rul. 72456, 1972-2 C.B. 468.
-
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(2) If two or more qualifying properties are
received in the exchange, the taxpayer's
basis must be allocated between such
properties in proportion to their relative
fair market values. Rev. Rul. 68-36, 19681 C.B. 357; Mitchell v. Commissioner, 42
T.C. 953 (1964), ac., 1965-2 C.B. 6.
(3) If both qualifying property and boot are
received in the exchange, basis will first be
allocated to boot to the extent of its full
fair market value. For example, assume TP
has TP property with a fair market value of
$100,000 and a tax basis of $50,000 and he
exchanges it for X property (which is like
kind property) with a fair market value of
$80,000 plus securities with a fair market
value of $20,000. $20,000 of TP's $50,000
realized gain must be recognized due to the
presence of the $20,000 of boot (securities).
TP's basis in the X property would be
computed as follows:
$50,000
+20,000
$70,000
-20,000
$50,000

Basis in TP property
Gain recognized
Total basis of qualifying
and nonqualifying property
Basis allocable to
securities (fair market value
of securities)
Basis of X property

(4) Any liabilities encumbering the taxpayer's
property which are assumed or taken subject
to by the other party to the exchange will
be treated the same as cash received for
purposes of the basis computation rules.
S1031(d) (last sentence).
(a) If both of the properties exchanged are
encumbered by mortgages, and assuming
that no other boot is given or received
other than in the form of mortgages,
the basis of the acquired property
would be computed as follows:
Basis of property surrendered
-

Mortgage on-property surrendered

+
+

Mortgage on property received
Gain recognized

Net adjusted basis of newly
acquired property
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(5) The basis provisions of §1031(d) provide
the mechanism through which gains which are
not initially recognized under S1031(a)
will eventually be taxed. In essence, the
tax basis of the newly acquired property is
reduced under 51031(d) by the amount of the
unrecognized gain. Thus, when the newly
acquired property is later disposed of in a
taxable transaction the "latent gain" will
then be recognized. In the interim, if the
newly acquired property is depreciable
property the basis for depreciation is
correspondingly less, thus reducing the
amount of depreciation deductions the
taxpayer may claim. Of course, if the
taxpayer should die prior to disposition of
the newly acquired property, his estate
would be entitled to a stepped up basis in
the property under §1014 and the latent
gain would then be eliminated.
(6) Temp. Reg. S51.1031(d)-1T and 1.1060-1T(g)
were issued in 1988 governing the
relationship of SS1031 and 1060. If a transaction that would otherwise be an
"applicable asset acquisition" under §1060
is in part a §1031 exchange, the new
temporary regulations provide that §1060
applies not only to the qualifying property
but also to the boot received in exchange
for like kind property.
b. Holding period. Tacking of holding periods is
authorized under §1223(1) with respect to
qualifying properties if such properties are
either capital assets, as defined in §1221, or
properties described in §1231.
6. Relationship to depreciation recapture provisions.
a. Section 1245. Section 1245(b)(4) carves out an
exception to the general recognition forcing
rule of §1245(a) and provides that if property
is disposed of and gain is not recognized in
whole or in part under §1031, then the amount
of gain to be recognized under §1245(a)(1)
shall not exceed the sum of the following:
(1) the amount of gain recognized on the
disposition (determined without regard to
§1245 -- i.e., due to the presence of

boot), plus
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(2) the fair market value of non-section 1245
property that is not taken into account
under (1) above.
If only like kind ("qualifying") properties are
exchanged, then no gain will be recognized
under §1245 except to the extent that the fair
market value of the §1245 property disposed of
exceeds the fair market value of the §1245
On
property received. See, S1245(b)(4)(B).
the other hand, if gain is recognized on the
S1031 exchange because of the presence of boot,
then the potential S1245 recapture income will
be recognized subject to the limitations set
forth in (1) and (2) above.
b. Section 1250. Section 1250(d)(4) provides that
if properties are exchanged and gain is not
recognized in whole or in part under §1031,
then the amount of S1250 gain that is to be
recognized will be limited to the greater of
the following:
(1) The
amount of gain recognized under §1031
(i.e.,
due to the presence of boot), or
(2) The excess of the amount of realized §1250
gain over the fair market value of the
§1250 property received in the exchange.
It should be noted that, under §1250(e) there
will be no tacking or holding periods in an
§1031 exchange of S1250 properties for the
purposes of determining the "applicable
percentage" under the recapture phase-out
rules.
7. Different treatment of parties to exchange. It is
permissible to have one party to an exchange
qualify for nonrecognition treatment under §1031
while the other party does not. See, e.g., Rev.
Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 304.
8. Exchanges between related parties. The Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1989 added new S§1031(f) and
(g) limiting the application of §1031
nonrecognition treatment with respect to exchanges
between related parties.
a. The impetus for the change was the concern of
Congress that §1031 was being employed to avoid
the impact of TRA '86's repeal of General
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Utilities. For example, assume corporation X
owns 100% of the stock of the corporations Y
and Z. Corporation Y owns property 1 with a
fair market value of $1,000,000 and a tax basis
of $100,000. Corporation Z owns property 2
with a fair market value and basis of
$1,000,000. Corporation Y desires to sell
property 1 but does not want to incur the tax
on $900,000 of gain inherent in the property.
In order to avoid taxation on this gain,
corporation Y and corporation Z exchanges
property 1 for property 2. Sometime after the
exchange, corporation Z, which now owns
property 1 with a new $1,000,000 substituted
basis (see, 51031(d)) sells property 1 and
recognizes no gain on the transaction.
b. In order to preclude the result described in
8.a., above, §1031(f) now provides that if a
taxpayer obtains nonrecognition treatment under
S1031 upon an exchange of property with a
"related person," nonrecognition treatment will
be lost if either the taxpayer or the related
party dispose of either property within a specified period of time.
(1) Any gain or loss not recognized by reason
of §1031(f) will, subject to the loss
nonrecognition rules of §267 be recognized
as of the date of the subsequent
disposition. §1031(f)(1)(C).
c. The purgatory period of §1031(f) commences with
the date of the first transfer and runs through
the date prior to the second anniversary of the
last transfer that was a part of the original
exchange. S1031(f)(1)(A) and (C) (read
together).
(1) The two (plus) year period will be
suspended and held open under §1031(g) for
any period of time in which any of the
exchange properties for which
nonrecognition treatment was afforded under
S1031 are subject to a "put," a "call," a
short sale or any transaction with similar
effect (providing that such put, call, etc.
arose prior to the expiration of the twoyear period).
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d. In defining "related parties," S1031(f)(3)
adopts the definitional rules contained in
S267(b) and 5707(b)(1).
e. Section 1031(f)(2) provides exceptions to the
forced recognition rules of §1031(f)(1) in the
following instances:
(1) After the earlier of the death of the
taxpayer or the related person; or
(2) A disposition resulting from a compulsory
or involuntary conversion (provided that
the original exchange was finalized before
the threat or imminence of such
conversion); or
(3) In other circumstances if it is established
to the satisfaction of the Service that
neither the original exchange nor the
subsequent disposition had as one of its
principal purposes the avoidance of federal
income tax.
f. New S§1031(f) and (g) apply generally to
transfers occurring after July 10, 1989
(subject to the normal binding contract rules).
D. Multi-party exchanges
1. Factual setting. The original draftsman of §1031
and its predecessor provisions undoubtedly
envisioned its application in "barter" transactions
in which each party owned property that the other
party desired and they would simply exchange these
properties. In reality, however, this rarely
occurs. In most instances, if X wishes to acquire
the taxpayer's property he probably will not own
property that the taxpayer would like to acquire in
an exchange and, further, X probably would have
little interest in participating in a land exchange
but for the fact that this may be the only method
by which he can acquire the taxpayer's property.
In such a situation X may agree to accommodate the
taxpayer by acquiring property selected by the
taxpayer for the sole purpose of swapping it for
the taxpayer's property. Thus, another party, the
owner ("C") of the property that the taxpayer would
like to acquire in the exchange is interjected into
the picture. This scenario and a number of
variations thereof is referred to as a "multi-party
exchange." Most multi-party exchanges fall into
- 56 -

one of two molds -- the "three-cornered exchange"

and the "four-party exchange."
a. Three-cornered exchange. A typical threecornered exchange derives its name from the
fact that it involves three participants -- the

taxpayer who owns TP property; X who wants to
acquire the TP property; and C, who owns the C
property that TP would like to acquire. The
transaction is usually structured in one of two
ways.
(1) In the most common pattern, X will acquire
the C property from C and immediately
thereafter exchange it with TP for the TP
property. The net result of these
transactions is that TP acquires the C
property in an §1031 exchange; C sells his
property in a taxable transaction; and X
ends up with the TP property and is "out of
pocket" the cost of the C property.
(2) Another popular variation of the threecornered exchange involves TP exchanging TP
property with C for the C property. C,
having just acquired the TP property in the
exchange, immediately thereafter sells the
TP property to X. The net result of this
transaction is the same as (1), above.
b. Four-party exchange. The four-party exchange
is similar to the three-cornered exchange
except that an "accommodation party" (i.e., a
"fourth party" in addition to the taxpayer, X
and C) assumes a role in the transaction. In
many instances the intended purchaser (X) of
the taxpayer's property is unwilling or unable
to acquire the property that the taxpayer
wishes to acquire in the exchange. In order to
effectuate the transfer the accommodation party
(usually a title company, a bank or, in some
instances, an attorney for one of the parties)
will either acquire the desired exchange
property, exchange it for the taxpayer's
property, and then sell it to X or, alternatively, acquire the exchange property and
resell it to X who then exchanges it for the
taxpayer's property.
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2. Essential elements of multi-party exchanges.
a. Evolution of the multi-party exchange.
Initially the Service considered multi-party
exchanges as being outside the realm of §1031
and took the position that they were tantamount
to a taxable sale followed by a reinvestment of
the proceeds. Fortunately for taxpayers, the
early decisions in this area adopted a liberal
construction of §1031 as it applied to multiparty exchange situations and established a
pro-taxpayer trend that, with some judicial
deviations, has been liberalized to an even
greater extent in.recent years. See, e.g.,
Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore v.
Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935), aca., XIV-1
C.B. 13; J. H. Baird Publishing Co. v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608 (1962), acg., 1963-2
CoB. 4; Alderson v.. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790
(9th Cir. 1963); and Coastal Terminals, Inc. v.
United States, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963)
(which represent the early line of cases
applying an expansive application of §1031 to
multi-party exchanges); and Biaqs v.
Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1981);
Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th
Cir. 1979); Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555
(1980); Brauer v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1134
(1980); Hayden v. United States, 82-2 U.S.T.C.
19604 (D.Wyo. 1981); and Garcia v.
Commissioner, 80 T.C. 491 (1983), ac., 1984-1
C.B. 1 (more recent and, if anything, more
liberal (pro-taxpayer) decisions than their
predecessors).
(1) Realistically, there is a fine line
dividing the characterization of many, if
not most, multi-party exchanges as S1031
exchanges rather than as taxable sales and
reinvestments. The courts have utilized
several familiar tax doctrines --

"substance over form," "step transaction"
and "constructive receipt" -- to analyze

the factual basis of multi-party exchanges
to support their findings of exchange
treatment. For a discussion of the
application of these three doctrines in the
area of multi-party exchanges, see, Guerin,
"A Proposed Test for Evaluating Multi-Party
Like Kind Exchanges," 35 Tax L. Rev. 547,
555-586 (1980). However, "one cannot
escape the impression that if it were not
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for the fact that the early decisions in
three-party exchange cases applied S1031 in
a liberal manner, and later decisions
'followed the leader' on the basis of stare
decisis, there might have been a trend
against the taxpayer's position." Dean,
"Three-Party Exchanges of Real Estate," 17
Tulane Tax Inst., 131, 137.
(2) After numerous setbacks, the Service
finally capitulated and acknowledged the
applicability of S1031 in "standard" types
of multi-party exchanges. Rev. Rul. 75291, 1975-2 C.B. 333, and Rev. Rul. 77-297,
1977-2 C.B. 304.
(3) Despite the favorable trend of the cases,
several decisions stand out as a clear
warning to taxpayers and their counsel that
the formalities of an exchange must be
adhered to: Carlton v. Commissioner, 385
F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967); Rogers v.
Commissioner, 44 T.C. 126 (1965), aff'd per
curiam, 377 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1967);
Bezdiian v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d 217 (9th
Cir. 1988); Halpern v. United States, 286
F.Supp. 255 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Swaim v.
United States, 79-2 U.S.T.C. 9462 (N.D.
Tex. 1979), aff'd, 81-2 U.S.T.C. 19575 (5th
Cir. 1981), Meadows v. Commissioner, 42 CCH
T.C.M. 611 (1981); Allen v. Commissioner,
49 CCH T.C.M. 1352 (1985); and Lee v.
Commissioner, 51 CCH T.C.M. 1438 (1986).
In a Tax Court decision holding in favor of
the taxpayer, the Tax Court made the
following observation:
The "exchange" requirement poses an
analytical problem because it runs
headlong into the familiar tax law
maxim that the substance of a
transaction controls over form. In a
sense, the substance of a transaction
in which the taxpayer sells property
and immediately reinvests the proceeds
in like kind property is not much
different from the substance of a
transaction in which two parcels are
exchanged without cash . . . yet, if

the exchange requirement is to have any
significance at all, the perhaps
formalistic difference between the two
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types of transactions must at least on
occasion, engender different results.
(Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555
(1980))

b. Essential elements. Despite the liberal trend
of the cases in this area, the Courts have set
down certain prerequisites for recognition of
multi-party exchanges as valid §1031 exchanges.
(1) There must be an intent to effect an
exchange. In most multi-party exchanges,
the purchaser ("X") reserves the option to
pay cash for the taxpayer's property which,
if exercised, would preclude the
applicability of S1031. If the contract is
not properly drafted, the true intent of
the parties (i.e., whether to effect a sale
or exchange) is often difficult to
determine. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Coastal Terminals. Inc. v.
United States, made the following
observation in this regard:
Whether the transaction constituted a
sale or an exchange for income tax
purposes depends on the intent of the
parties and this intent is to be
ascertained from all relevant facts and
circumstances, and of necessity the
case is largely dependent upon
circumstantial evidence. (320 F.2d
333, 337 (emphasis added))
For other cases in which the intent factor
was stressed by the Courts, see, Alderson
v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.
1963); 124 Front Street, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 6 (1975), ac., 19762 C.B. 2, nonacg., 1976-2 C.B. 3; and
Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555 (1980).
However, the intent of the parties to
effect an exchange will not be sufficient
in and of itself to characterize an
otherwise defective transaction as an §1031
exchange. Carlton v. Commissioner, 385
F.2d 238 (5th.Cir. 1967); and Rogers v.
Commissioner, 44 T.C. 126 (1965), aff'd per
curiam, 377 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1967).
(2) An "exchange" must actually be consummated.
Carlton v. Commissioner, supra; Bezdjian v.
-
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Commissioner, 845 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1988);
Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394 (1969),
acq,

1970-2 C.B. XIX; Rogers v.

Commissioner, supra; Swaim v. United
States, 81-2 U.S.T.C. 19575 (5th Cir.
1981); Meadows v. Commissioner, 42 CCH
T.C.M. 611 (1981); Allen v. Commissioner,
43 CCH T.C.M. 1045 (1982); Anderson v.
Commissioner, 49 CCH T.C.M. 1352 (1985);
and Lee v. Commissioner, 51 CCH T.C.M. 1438
(1986).
(3) The "other parties" to the transaction must
not be the taxpayer's agents. This is a
crucial determination, especially in fourparty exchanges, and represents one of the
Service's principal points of attack in
some recent cases. However, the Courts
have thus far been very tolerant in this
area, even to the point of ignoring strong
circumstantial evidence of the existence of
an agency relationship between the taxpayer
and the accommodation party, so long as
there is no express agency agreement
between the taxpayer and the accommodation
party. See, Alderson v. Commissioner, 317
F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963); Mercantile Trust
Co. of Baltimore v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A.
82 (1935), ac., XIV-1 C.B. 13; J. H. Baird
Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608
(1962), acq., 1963-2 C.B. 4; Coupe v.
Commissioner, supra; and Biggs v.
Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir.
1981). However, the IRS apparently takes
the position that an agency relationship
will depend upon who has assumed the risk
in the acquisition of the exchange
property. See, Rev. Rul. 77-297, 1977-2
C.B. 304.
(4) The taxpayer must not actually or
constructively receive cash in the
transaction. Swaim v. United States, 81-2
U.S.T.C. 9575 (5th Cir. 1981). Halpern v.
United States, 286 F.Supp. 255 (N.D. Ga.
1968); Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555
(1980); Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394
(1969), ac., 1970-2 C.B. XIX; see,
generally, Rev. Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 C.B.
304.
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3. Permissible actions in multi-party exchanges-.
a. Exchange contract may provide for alternative
cash sale. Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d
790 (9th Cir. 1963); Mercantile Trust Co. of
Baltimore v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935),
ac , XIV-1 C.B. 13; and Rev. Rul. 77-297,
1977-2 C.B. 304.
b. Taxpayer may require other party to construct
improvements on new property which taxpayer
will acquire in the exchange. Coastal
Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333
(4th Cir. 1963); J. H. Baird Publishing Co. v.
1963-2
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608 (1962), ac.q,
C.B. 4; Rev. Rul. 75-291, 1975-2 C.B. 333.
(1) However, a taxpayer's transfer of property
in exchange for another party's
construction of improvements on other
property of the taxpayer will not qualify
under S1031. Bloomington Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 14
(7th Cir. 1951).
(2) Query, the result if the taxpayer sells
property No. 1 (which has a high basis in
his hands) to the other party (X) and
simultaneously enters into a contract with
X to construct improvements on property No.
1 and reconvey it to the taxpayer in
exchange for other property owned by the
taxpayer (which has a low basis in the
taxpayer's hands)? Compare Ltr. Rul.
7823035 and 8217106 (which hold for the
taxpayer) with Smith v. Commissioner, 537
F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1976) (which reached an
opposite conclusion).
c. Taxpayer may locate suitable property to be
received in exchange and may negotiate for
acquisition of such property. Coastal
Terminals, Inc. v. United States, supra;
Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th
Cir. 1963); Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394
(1969), aca.,

1970-2 C.B. VIX; Rutland v.

Commissioner, 36 CCH T.C.M. 40 (1977); and
Garcia v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 491 (1983).
d. Taxpayer may loan money to other party to
enable him to acquire and/or improve property
to be received by taxpayer in the exchange.
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124 Front Street, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.
6 (1975), acq, 1976-2 C.B. 2, nonacg., 1976-2
C.B. 3; Coupe v. Commissioner, supra; Biggs v.
Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1981).
e. Other party to exchange need not actually take
title to exchange property. W.D. Haden Co. v.
Commissioner, 165 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1948);
Rutland v. Commissioner, 36 CCH T.C.M. 40
(1977); Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171
(5th Cir. 1981); and Brauer v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 1134 (1980).
f. Taxpayer may reimburse other party for his
closing costs incurred to acquire exchange
property. Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171
(5th Cir. 1981); Rutland, supra.
g. A general caveat with respect to use of too
many, or all, of the above referenced actions
was sounded by the Tax Court in Barker:
Notwithstanding those deviations from the
standard multiple-party exchanges which
have received judicial approval, at some
point the confluence of some sufficient
number of deviations will bring about a
taxable result. Whether the cause be
economic and business realities or poor tax
planning, prior cases make clear that
taxpayers who stray too far run the risk of
having their transactions characterized as
a sale and. reinvestment.
E. Deferred exchanges.
1. Description. A great deal of interest, both on the
part of taxpayers and the Service, has focused on
developments in the area of deferred multi-party
exchanges. The fact pattern is as follows: The
taxpayer owns property which he desires to exchange
(rather than sell) for suitable like kind property
in an.S1031 exchange. X desires to acquire the
taxpayer's property and is willing to cooperate in
effecting a tax free exchange. However, the
taxpayer may not have located suitable property for
exchange or, if located, the exchange property may
not be available for an immediate exchange. The
taxpayer and X agree that the taxpayer will
transfer his property to X now in exchange for X's
promise to acquire suitable exchange property and
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convey it to the taxpayer within some given time
frame.
2. Issues in deferred exchanges and case history.
Several issues arise within the context of a
deferred exchange.
a. Has there been an "exchange"? If "exchange" is
given its customary meaning, it would
presumably encompass only a simultaneous,
reciprocal transfer of properties between the
two parties. However, case law has not adopted
such a literal interpretation of "exchange" for
the purposes of §1031. Redwing Carriers, Inc.
v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968);
Starker v. United States, 602 F. 2d 1341 (9th
Cir. 1979); Starker v. United States, 432 F.
Supp. 864 (D.C. Ore. 1977); J. H. Baird
Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608
(1962), aca., 1963-2 C.B. 4; and Rutherford v.
Commissioner, 37 CCH T.C.M. 1851 (1978).
b. Are the initial transfer of the taxpayer's
property to X and the subsequent transfer of
the exchange property by X to the taxpayer
"steps in a single, integrated transaction"?
The application of the step transaction
doctrine in the area of S1031 exchanges has
been summarized as follows:
When a series of related steps is part of a
preconceived plan, they should be regarded
as one transaction in determining whether
taxable gain or loss is recognized. On the
other hand, where there is no
interdependency between the steps, each
must be treated separately in determining
tax consequences. In order to determine
whether the doctrine should apply, the test
is whether the steps were so mutually,
interdependent that the legal relations
created by one transaction would have been
fruitless without a completion of the
(Guerin, "A Proposed Test for
series.
Evaluating Multi-Party Like Kind
Exchanges," 35 Tax L. Rev. 547, 577 (1980),
citing American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C.
397, 405 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 177 F.2d
513 (3rd Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
920 (1950))

-
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Other authors have postulated that the proper
application of the step transaction doctrine to
deferred multi-party exchanges should be as
follows:
* .
the integrated transaction doctrine
should be interpreted so that a Taxpayer
should not be denied 51031 treatment when
he parts with title to the Original
Property in exchange for something other
than the immediate receipt of title to the
Exchange Property, so long as the
acquisition of the 'something' is a step in
the acquisition of the Exchange Property,
and does not give the Taxpayer the option
to terminate the transaction and be left
with the cash value of the Original
Property. (Levun and Gehring, "Like Kind
Exchanges: Is Simultaneity a Requirement?"
34 Tax Lawyer 119, 131 (1980))
c. Is X's promise to convey exchange property to
the taxpayer at a future date a "chose in
action" or, alternatively,, a "cash equivalent"
which would not qualify as like kind property?
At least two courts have held that it is not
(Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th
Cir. 1979); and Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.
394, 409 (1969), acg., 1970-2 C.B. VIX), and
the enactment of §1031(a)(3) by TRA '84 leaves
no doubt that such promises will not be viewed
as choses in action or cash equivalents.
3. IRS position on deferred exchanges prior to TRA
'84. The Service initially approved a deferred
exchange in Ltr. Rul. 7938087 on June 22, 1979.
However, on November 8, 1979, the Service announced
that it was reconsidering its position on deferred
exchanges in Ltr. Rul. 8005049. Finally, on August
25, 1980, the IRS revoked Ltr. Rul. 7938087 stating
that

"

.

. . it has been concluded the non-

simultaneous nature of the exchange in this case
does not satisfy the requirements of S1031 . .
Ltr. Rul. 8046122. Thus, prior to TRA '84, the
Service took the position that simultaneity was a
requirement for §1031 treatment. However, see,
Rev. Rul. 57-451, 1957-2 C.B. 295 in which IRS held
that simultaneity was not required in the case of
an §1036 exchange.
4. Status of the law prior to TRA '84.
Notwithstanding the announced position of the IRS
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in Ltr. Rul. 8046122 to the contrary, case law
indicated that simultaneity was not, per se, a
requirement for qualification under §1031. Starker
v. United states, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979);
Starker v. United States, 602 F. Supp. 864 (D.C.
Ore. 1977); Redwing Carriers. Inc. v. Tomlinson,
399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968); and Rutherford v.
See,
Commissioner, 37 CCH TC.M. 1851-77 (1978).
also, Rev. Rul. 61-119, 1961-1 C.B. 395.
5. Time and identification limits imposed by TRA '84.
Because of uncertainty and potential abuses in
deferred exchanges under S1031, Congress acted to
permit deferred exchanges under certain limited
conditions with its enactment of §1031(a)(3) in TRA
'84. Specifically, the General Explanation of the
Revenue Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1984,
pages 243-247 (Staff of Joint Committee on
Taxation) provides the following reasons for
enactment of 51031(a)(3):
(1) in deferred
exchanges, the transaction more closely resembles a
sale of one property following by a purchase of a
second property rather than an exchange; (2) the
rationale for deferred treatment in like kind
exchanges regarding the difficulty of valuing
property which is exchanged solely or primarily for
similar property is less applicable to deferred
like kind exchanges because in such deferred
exchanges the transferred property must be valued
at a specific or near-specific dollar amount in
order to determine the aggregate value of the
properties that the taxpayer may receive in the
future; and (3) Congress was concerned that the
like kind exchange rules, absent time limitations,
significantly expanded the ability of taxpayers to
avoid recognition of gain on deferred payment
sales, especially when used in conjunction with the
installment sales rules. Specifically, §1031(a)(3)
requires the following:
a. Identification. Property will not be treated
as like kind property unless the property is
identified as property to be received in the
exchange on or before the day which is 45 days
after the date on which the taxpayer transfers
the property relinquished in the exchange.
b. Receipt of property. Property will not be
treated as like kind property unless it is
received no later than the earlier of: (1) the
day which is 180 days after the date on which
the taxpayer transfers the property
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relinquished in the exchange; or (2) the due
date (determined with regard to extensions) for
the transferor's return of the tax imposed for
the taxable year in which the transfer of the
relinquished property occurs.
6. Final regulations governing deferred exchanges. On
May 1, 1991, final regulations were issued by
Treasury governing deferred exchanges which apply
to transfers of property made on or after June 10,
1991 (subject to certain rules applicable to
transfers made on or after May 16, 1990). Reg.
S1.1031(k)-1(o). The final regulations are very
similar to the prior proposed regulations issued on
May 16, 1990. The new regulations define "deferred
exchanges," establish operating rules for the
identification and receipt of replacement
properties, create four safe harbors from the
constructive receipt principles of general tax law,
and provide additional guidance in the computation
of gain, loss and basis in deferred exchanges.
a. The issuance of the final regulations is likely
to give a boost to the already accelerating use
of deferred exchanges by taxpayers. Recentchanges in the tax laws have increased capital
gains rates and corporate rates and have
curtailed the use of installment sales as well.
By contrast, the advantages of tax deferred
exchanges now look even better as a result of
the clarification and liberalization of the
deferred exchange rules contained in the new
regulations.
7. Definition of deferred exchange.
a. Reg. §1.1031(k)-l(a) defines a deferred
exchange as follows:
1 . . . an exchange in which, pursuant to
an agreement, the taxpayer transfers
property held for productive use in a trade
or business or for investment (the
"relinquished property") and subsequently
receives property to be held either for
productive use in a trade or business or
for investment (the "replacement
property")."
b. The rather broad definition of a deferred
exchange set forth above must be read in
conjunction with the balance of the final
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regulations which impose some very important
limitations.
(1) Reg. 5l.1031(k)-l(a) states that any
replacement property that otherwise meets
these definitional criteria will
nevertheless be treated as boot. (i.e.,
non-qualifying property) unless all the
requirements regarding the identification
and receipt of the replacement property
established under Reg. SSl.1031(k)-l(b),(c)
and (d) are satisfied.
(2) In addition to singling out the
identification and receipt requirements for
special emphasis, Reg. §l.1031(k)-l(a) also
highlights the other major issue in
deferred exchanges -- actual or

constructive receipt of boot attributable
to the taxpayer's efforts to secure
performance by other parties to the
deferred exchange.
(3) The final regulations, like the prior
proposed regulations, do not apply to the
so-called "reverse-Starker" transactions in
which the taxpayer receives replacement
property prior to the date on which the
taxpayer transfers the relinquished
property. The Service announced in the
preamble to the final regulations that it
had concluded that the deferred exchange
rules of §1031(a)(3) do not apply to
reverse-Starker transactions. Preamble to
T.D. 83-46. However, the Service also
indicated it would continue to study the
applicability of the general rules of
51031(a)(1) to these transactions. Id.
(a) Some taxpayer representatives are
relying on a variety of techniques to
accomplish the same end result as the
reverse-Starker exchange. These
includes "parking" the relinquished
property with a qualified intermediary
and the use of options discussed in
III.D.l. supra.
8. Identification requirements.
a. Section 1031(a)(3)(A) requires that any
replacement property to be received in a
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deferred exchange be "identified" within 45
days after the taxpayer transfers the
relinquished property. Reg. S§1.1031(k)-1(b),
(c) and (e) establish the parameters for this
identification process. As a practical matter,
the 45-day identification requirement is the
most difficult of all the S1031(a)(3)
requirements to meet. If the taxpayer does not
already have the luxury of a running start in
finding suitable replacement property prior to
the closing on the transfer of the relinquished
property, it is frequently very difficult to
locate suitable replacement property within 45
days of the date of transfer. Consequently, it
is usually prudent to begin the process of
locating acceptable replacement properties
prior to executing an exchange agreement or, if
that is not possible, to at least defer closing
as much as possible in order to buy extra time
for the taxpayer to accomplish this important
objective.
b. Reg. Sl.1031(k)-1(b)(2) provides that the 45day period, which is referred to in the
regulations as the "identification period"
begins on the date the taxpayer transfers the
relinquished property and ends at midnight on
the 45th day thereafter.
(1) If two or more relinquished properties are
transferred on different dates, the
identification period begins on the date of
the earliest transfer. Reg. §1.1031(k)1(b)(2)(iii).
(2) For purposes of determining the date on
which the identification period ends, §7503
(relating to-the time for performance of
acts where the last day falls on a
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday) does not
apply. In other words, if the 45-day
period ends on July 4, the identification
period will terminate on that date
notwithstanding the fact that it is a
national holiday. Moreover, no discretion
is given to the Service to extend the
identification period, regardless of
hardship or other good cause shown. Reg.
S1.1031(k)-1(c) contains the exclusive
rules for identification of replacement
property. Replacement property may be
identified in one of two ways:
- 69 -

(a) Property will be treated as having been
identified if it is ".

. . designated

as replacement property in a written
document signed by the taxpayer and
hand delivered, mailed, telecopied, or
otherwise sent before the end of the
identification period to either the
person obligated to transfer the
replacement property to the taxpayer
(regardless of whether such person is a
'disqualified person' under Reg.
S1.1031(k)-l(k)) or any other person
involved in the exchange other than the
taxpayer or a 'disqualified person.'"
A written agreement which meets all the
identification requirements described
in the-preceding sentence and which is
signed by all parties to the
transaction will also suffice,
regardless of whether it is 'sent' to a
person involved in the exchange. Reg.
Sl.1031(k)-l(c)(2).
(b) Any replacement property actually
received by the taxpayer before the
expiration of the identification period
will in all events be treated as having
been identified within such period.
Reg. Sl.1031(k)-1(c)(1).
c. Replacement property must be "unambiguously
described" in the written document or
agreement. Reg. S1.1031(k)-1(c)(3).
(1) Real property will be treated as
unambiguously described if it is described
by a legal description, street address, or
a distinguishable name (e.g., the Mayfair
Apartment Building). Reg. §1.1031(k)1(c)(3).
(a) Query: What happens if there is an
error in the legal description or
address?
(b) While the use of a "distinguishable
name" is now permitted in the final
regulations (this was not included in
the proposed regulations) it is
advisable to not only identify the name
of the building but also give a street
address or legal description in
-
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conjunction therewith. For example, if
there are two or more Mayfair Apartment
Buildings located in Atlanta, Georgia,
would such a designation be sufficient?
(2) Identification of personal property must be
made by specific description of the
particular type of property. For example,
a truck generally is unambiguously
described if it is described by a specific
make, model and year. Reg. Si.1031(k)1(c)(3).
(3) Solely for purposes of the identification
process, property which is incidental to a
larger item of property will not be treated
as a separate item of property and, thus,
need not be separately identified. Reg.
S1.1031(k)-i(c)(5).
(a) Property will be treated as incidental
to a larger piece of property if it is
typically transferred in conjunction
with the larger property in standard
commercial transactions and if the
aggregate fair market value of all such
incidental property does not exceed 15%
of the aggregate fair market value of
the larger item of property. Id.
i) For example, furniture, laundry
machines and miscellaneous items of
personal property will be treated
as incidental to an apartment
building with a fair market value
of $1,000,000 provided that the
aggregate fair market value of such
items does not exceed $150,000.
Reg. 1.1031(k)-i(c)(5) Ex. 2.
d. Alternative and/or multiple properties may be
designated in accordance with the designation
rules in certain circumstances enumerated in
Reg. §i.1031(k)-i(c)(4).
(1) Reg. §i.1031(k)-l(c)(4) provides that,
regardless of the number of relinquished
properties transferred by the taxpayer in
an integrated transaction, the taxpayer
must meet one of two alternative tests if
he wishes to designate alternative or
multiples properties. This requirement
-
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will allow the taxpayer to designate
either:
(a) Three properties without regard to the
fair market values of such properties;
or
(b) Any number of properties as long as
their aggregate fair market value as of
the end of the identification period
does not exceed 200% of the aggregate
fair market value of all the
relinquished properties as of the date
the relinquished properties were
transferred by the taxpayer.
(2) Reg. Sl.1031(k)-l(c)(4)(ii) warns that if
at the end of the identification period the
taxpayer has identified more property than
is permitted under the alternative rules
described above, the taxpayer will be
treated as if he had failed to identify any
property under such rules. Fortunately,
the regulations contain exceptions to this
rather harsh rule for the following types
of property:
(a) Property which is both identified and
received within the identification
period, and
(b) Property identified before the end of
the identification period and received
before the end of the exchange period
(defined below) but only if identified
property constituting at least 95% of
the aggregate fair market value of all
identified replacement property is
actually received by the taxpayer
before the end of the exchange period.
For purposes of the 95% rule, the fair
market value of each identified
replacement property is determined as
of the earlier of the date the property
is received by the taxpayer or the last
day of the exchange period. Id.
(3) The application of the 200% rule may be
fraught with problems since the
determination of fair market value is
always subjective and inherently difficult
to pin down. It will almost always be
-
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prudent to rely upon the three property
rule rather than the 200% rule whenever
possible.
(4) It should be noted that the regulations do
not require alternative or multiple
property designations to be prioritized.
In other words, the taxpayer is free to
pick any of the alternative properties
designated regardless of the order of
designation.
e. A designation of property may be revoked at any
time prior to the expiration of the designation
period. Reg. §1.1031(k)-l(c)(6).
(1) Revocation may only be accomplished by a
written document signed by the taxpayer and
hand delivered, mailed, telecopied, or
otherwise sent before the end of the
identification period to the person to whom
the identification of the replacement
property was sent or, if the original
designation was accomplished in a written
agreement signed by all of the parties,
then revocation may be accomplished either
by written amendment to the original
agreement or by written notice from the
taxpayer to all parties to the original
written agreement. Id.
(2) An oral revocation will not be effective.
Reg. §1.1031(k)-i(c)(6) and (7). Ex. 7.
f. Special rules are included for replacement
property that is to be produced or constructed.
Reg. §1.1031(k)-l(e) provides that replacement
property need not be in existence at the time
the relinquished property is transferred. In
such case, the replacement property must still
be identified in accordance with the general
rules of Reg. §l.1031(k)-i(c), but special
rules also apply. For example, if the
identified replacement property consists of
improved real property where the improvements
are to be constructed, the description of the
replacement property must satisfy the normal
requirements of Reg. §1.1031(k)-i(c)(3) (i.e.,
legal description, street address or
distinguishable name) and as much detail as
provided regarding construction of the
improvements as is practicable at the time the
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identification is made.
1(e)(2)(i).

Reg. §1.1031(k)-

g. The dates of identification and receipt of
replacement property must be reported on Form
8824 which must be filed in connection with the
exchange transaction.
9. Requirements for receipt of identified replacement
property.
a. Section 1031(a)(3)(B) provides that property
otherwise qualifying as replacement property
and which has been properly identified within
the applicable identification period must also
be received by the taxpayer within a specified
time period. The rules governing receipt of
identified replacement property are contained
in Reg. §S1.1031(k)-l(b) and (d).
b. Reg. S1.1031(k)-l(b)(1) states that any
property which is not received within the
"exchange period" will be treated as boot. The
"exchange period" is defined in Reg.
Sl.1031(k)-l(b)(2) as a period beginning on the
first date the taxpayer transfers the relinquished property and ending on the earlier of
(i) 180 days thereafter or (ii),the due date
(including extensions) for the taxpayer's tax
return for his taxable year in which the
transfer of the relinquished property occurred.
(1) The rules for determining the commencement
date of the exchange period as well as the
date of expiration of the exchange period
are identical to those applicable to the
identification period. See, IV.E.8.b.
suRa.
c. Replacement property will only be deemed to
have been received within the exchange period
if the requirements of Reg. §1.1031(k)-1(d) are
met.
(1) Such requirements will be satisfied if:
(a) The taxpayer receives the replacement
property before the end of the exchange
period, and

-
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(b) The replacement property is substantially the same as the property
identified.
If the taxpayer has identified more than
one replacement property, these tests are
applied separately to each replacement
property. Reg. §1.1031(k)-l(d)(1).
(2) The use of the term "substantially the
same" is somewhat vague but apparently
incorporates a degree of tolerance for a
minor change of circumstances. The
regulations attempt to shed some light on
this standard in examples which,
unfortunately, raise as many questions as
they answer.
(a) In one example the taxpayer identifies
real property Q as replacement
property. Real property Q consists of
a barn on two acres of land and has a
fair market value of $250,000 ($187,500
for the barn and underlying land as a
unit, and $87,500 for the remaining
land). At the taxpayer's direction,
the other party purchases the barn and
the land lying immediately beneath the
barn for $187,500 and arranges to have
it conveyed to the taxpayer.
Simultaneously, the taxpayer paid the
owner of the identified property
$87,500 and acquired the remaining
acreage. The example concludes that
the barn and underlying land "differ in
basic nature or character" from the
property as a whole. Consequently, the
taxpayer is not considered to have
received substantially the same
property as identified. Reg.
S1.1031(k)-l(d)(2) Ex. 3.
(b) In a second example, the taxpayer
identifies the replacement property
consisting of two acres of unimproved
land with a fair market value of
$250,000. At the taxpayer's direction,
the other party to the exchange
purchases 1-1/2 acres of the identified
property for $187,500 and transfers it
to the taxpayer. The taxpayer pays
$87,500 and acquires the remaining 1/2
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acre. The example concludes that the
portion of the replacement property
received by the taxpayer does not
differ from the basic nature or
character of the identified property as
a whole. Moreover, the fair market
value of the portion of the identified
real property received by the taxpayer
($187,500) is 75% of the fair market
value of the entire identified property
as of the date of receipt. The example
concludes that the taxpayer is
considered to have received
substantially thesame property as
identified. Reg. S1.1031(k)-l(d)(2)
Ex. 4.
i) It is not clear whether the example
is intended to establish 75% as a
"bright line test" for the minimum
necessary to meet the "substantially the same" standard
(provided, of course, that the
property is of the same nature or
character).
d. Special rules also apply with respect to
replacement property that is to be produced or
constructed.
(1) Reg. §1.1031(k)-1(e)(3)(i) provides that,
for purposes of determining whether the
replacement property to be produced or
constructed and which is actually received
within the exchange period is to be treated
as "substantially the same" as the property
originally identified by the taxpayer,
variations due to usual or typical
production changes are not taken into
account. However, if substantial changes
are made in the property to be produced,
the replacement property received will not
be considered to be substantially the same
property as identified.
(2) If the identified property is real property
and improvements to be constructed are not
completed prior to the expiration of the
exchange, but title to the replacement
property is nevertheless transferred to the
taxpayer within the exchange period, the
replacement property will be considered to
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be substantially the same property as
identified if:
(a) The replacement property received
constitutes real property under local
law, and
(b) If the construction had been completed
on or before the date the taxpayer
received the property, it would have
been considered substantially the same
as the property identified. Reg.
§1.1031(k)-1(e)(3)(iii).
Notwithstanding the apparent generosity of
this rule, Reg. S1.1031(k)-l(e)(4) provides
that the value of any production or
construction that takes place after the
receipt of the replacement property by the
taxpayer will not qualify as like kind
property. Thus, any additional production
occurring with respect to the replacement
property after the property is received by
the taxpayer will not be treated as the
receipt of property of a like kind. Id.
10. Safe harbors from constructive receipt rules.
a. General. The primary interest of most tax
practitioners in the new regulations focuses on
the safe harbors that they establish. These
safe harbors are important because they enable
taxpayers to secure performance by the other
parties to the exchange without the risk that
the taxpayer will be deemed to have
"constructively received" payment in the form
of cash or other non-qualifying property. In
Starker, the taxpayer accepted the unsecured
promise of Crown Zellerbach to acquire and
transfer replacement property to the taxpayer
over a period of time. Few, if any, taxpayers
today are willing to rely upon an unsecured
promise to perform. Consequently, the safe
harbors from the constructive receipt rules are
extremely important to almost any taxpayer
participating in a deferred exchange.
(1) Reg. §Sl.1031(k)-l(f) and (g) contain
guidelines for determining whether a
taxpayer who transfers relinquished
property in a deferred exchange will be
treated as having actually or
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constructively received cash or other nonqualifying property (i.e., "boot").
(a) The regulations begin with the premise
that if a taxpayer actually or
constructively receives boot in the
full amount of the consideration for
the relinquished property before he
actually receives like kind replacement
property, the transaction will be
classified as a sale rather than a
deferred exchange, even though the
taxpayer may ultimately receive like
kind property. Reg. §1.1031(k)1(f)(1).
(b) The taxpayer will be in "actual
receipt" of boot at the time he
actually receives such boot or receives
the economic benefit thereof. Reg.
S1.1031(k)-l(f)(2).
(c) "Constructive receipt" of boot occurs
when the boot is

"

. . . credited to

the taxpayer's account, set apart from
the taxpayer, or otherwise made
available so that the taxpayer may draw
upon it at any time or so that the
taxpayer can draw upon it if notice of
intention to draw is given." Id.
b. The regulations established four limited safe
harbors to facilitate securing performance by
the other parties to a deferred exchange
without running afoul of the constructive
receipt rules. The safe harborsare contained
in Reg. §1.1031(k)-l(g). In many ways, these
safe harbor rules are surprisingly liberal and
go much further than the Service has been
willing to go in (for example) the installment
sale area.
(1) Since Congress did not delegate the
authority to establish substantive law when
it added §1031(a)(3) as part of TRA '84,
the establishment of the safe harbors must
be regarded as "interpretive regulations"
issued under the Service's general
interpretive authority granted by §7805.
Consequently, the regulations do not have
the force of law but presumably will be
respected by the courts unless they
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determine that the Service has exceeded its
interpretive authority in issuing the
regulations.
(2) One of the questions most frequently raised
to the draftsmen of the proposed
regulations governing deferred exchanges
was whether the safe harbors were mutually
exclusive. The final regulations addressed
this issue by specifically providing that
more than one safe harbor can be used for
the same deferred exchange, but the terms
and conditions of each safe harbor must be
separately satisfied. Thus, it is likely
that if a qualified intermediary is to be
used the taxpayer may want to combine this
with a qualified escrow as well in order to
provide additional security for
performance.
c. The first safe harbor -- security or guaranty

arrangements.
(1) Reg. S1.1031(k)-1(g)(2) provides that the
determination of whether the taxpayer in a
deferred exchange has actually or
constructively received boot will be made
without regard to the fact that the other
party's obligation to transfer replacement
property to the taxpayer is secured or
guaranteed by any or all of the following:
(a) A mortgage, deed of trust, or other
security interest in property (other
than cash or a cash equivalent);
(b) A standby letter of credit that
satisfies all the requirements of Reg.
S15A.453-1(b)(3)(iii) and which
precludes the taxpayer from drawing on
the letter of credit except upon a
default by the other party to the
exchange to transfer qualified
replacement property to the taxpayer;
or

(c) A guarantee of a third party.
(2) There may be some practical problems
associated with the use of a standby letter
of credit if the terms of Reg. §1.1031(k)l(g)(2)(i)(B) are applied literally. Under
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the conditions of this regulation, the
letter of credit must be non-negotiable,
non-transferable (except in connection with
the underlying obligation that it secures)
and must provide that it cannot be drawn
upon in the absence of a default on the
obligation which it secures. Few, if any,
commercial lenders would issue a letter of
credit in which the exercise was dependent
upon the existence of a "default" in an
underlying obligation. This places the
issuer of the letter of credit in the
position of determining whether or not
there has been a default under a legal
document. Under normal commercial
practices, the letter of credit could be
drawn upon the presentation of a draft
accompanied by a sworn statement that there
has been a default on the underlying
obligation (i.e., the existence of a
default need not be determined by the
issuer of the letter of credit -- the

issuer may simply rely upon the sworn
statement of the holder of the letter of
credit). Hopefully, the Service will
interpret this regulation consistent with
normal commercial practices in this regard.
Moreover, what happens if the other party
to the exchange is adjudicated bankrupt
prior to the expiration of the time for it
to acquire and convey the replacement
property? Technically, there is no default
until the expiration of the exchange period
but the bankruptcy of the other party makes
it clear that it will not fulfill its
obligation to acquire and convey
replacement property. May this be treated
as an anticipatory default thereby enabling
the taxpayer to draw upon the standby
letter of credit? Finally, it should be
noted that the period for exercise of the
standby letter of credit should extend at
least a few days after the expiration of
the exchange period, thereby enabling the
taxpayer to determine whether or not the
other party to the exchange has fulfilled
(or failed to fulfill) its obligations
under the exchange agreement and still be
able to exercise its rights as a secured
party under the letter of credit.
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(3) The guarantee of an obligation to acquire
and convey replacement property may be a
very useful vehicle to secure performance.
If properly structured, the guarantee
should not only guarantee performance on an
after-tax basis by the other party to the
exchange but also contain an obligation for
payment of liquidated damages based upon
any adverse tax consequences resulting to
the taxpayer from a failure to complete the
tax deferred exchange. The guarantee
should also be a guarantee of "payment" and
not of "collection," in order that the
taxpayer may proceed directly against the
guarantor in the event of a default.
(4) Reg. §l.1031(k)-l(g)(2)(ii) sounds a
warning that if the taxpayer has an
immediate ability or unrestricted right to
receive money or other property pursuant to
the security or guaranty agreement, the
benefits of the safe harbor will no longer
be available. For example, if the taxpayer
had a right to draw upon the letter of
credit in the absence of a default, he
would be deemed to have constructively
received monies from the letter of credit
at that time.
d. The second safe harbor -- qualified escrow

accounts and qualified trusts.
(1) The actual and constructive receipt rules
will also be applied to the taxpayer in a
deferred exchange without regard to the
fact that the obligations of one or more of
the other parties to the exchange are or
may be secured by cash or a cash equivalent
held in a "qualified escrow account" or in
a "qualified trust." Reg. §1.1031(k)l(g)(3).
(2) A "qualified escrow account" is one in
which the escrow holder is neither the
taxpayer nor a "disqualified person" (as
defined in Reg. §1.1031(k)-l(k) and
discussed in subparagraph (5) below), and
the taxpayer's rights to receive, pledge,
borrow or otherwise obtain the benefits of
the cash or cash equivalent held in escrow
are limited to the circumstances described
in Reg. §1.1031(k)-l(g)(6) (see, discussion
-
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in Part (4) below).
l(g)(3)(ii).

Reg. §l.1031(k)-

(3) A "qualified trust" is
trustee is neither the
"disqualified person,"
rights with respect to
equivalent held by the
restricted as provided
1(g)(6).

a trust in which the
taxpayer nor a
and the taxpayer's
any cash or cash
trustee are
in Reg. §1.1031(k)-

(4) The limitations upon the taxpayer's access
to any cash or cash equivalent held in a
qualified escrow or a qualified trust are
set forth in Reg. 51.1031(k)-l(g)(6).
These restrictions require that the
taxpayer's rights to any cash or cash
equivalent held in a qualified escrow or
qualified trust must be restricted until:
(a) After the expiration of the
identification period if the taxpayer
has not identified any replacement
property within the identification
period;
(b) After the taxpayer has received all of
the identified replacement property to
which he is entitled;
(c) If the taxpayer has identified
replacement property, then after the
later of the end of the identification
period or the occurrence of a material
and substantial contingency which
relates to the deferred exchange, which
is provided for in writing, and which
is beyond the control of the taxpayer
or a disqualified party (e.g., the
replacement property will only be
acquired if it could be rezoned for
multi-family use); or
(d) After the end of the exchange period.
Reg. S1.1031(k)-1(g)(6) requires that these
restrictions be specifically stated in the
exchange agreement.
(5) The definition of a "disqualified person"
is contained in Reg. 51.1031(k)-l(k).
Under this provision, a person will be
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deemed to be a "disqualified person" to the
taxpayer if:
(a) Such person and the taxpayer have a
relationship described either in
5267(b) or §707(b) (subject to certain
modifications).
i) Reg. Sl.1031(k)-l(g)(3)(iii)(A)
provides that, in the case of a
qualified trust, the relationship
between the taxpayer and the
trustee will not be considered a
relationship under §267(b).
Caveat: If the qualified trust is
to be used in conjunction with a
qualified intermediary the
exemption from 5267(b) for the
relationship between the taxpayer
and the trustee will apply in the
case of the qualified trust but not
in the case of the qualified
intermediary. This is a "glitch"
in the regulations which hopefully
will be cured in the future.
(b) Such person acts as a taxpayer's agent,
including performing services for the
taxpayer as the taxpayer's employee,
attorney, accountant, investment banker
or broker, or real estate agent or
broker within the two-year period
ending on the date of the transfer of
the first of the relinquished
properties (but, in making such
determination, the performance of
services in connection with the
exchange itself or a routine financial,
title insurance, escrow or trust
services for the taxpayer by a
financial institution, title insurance
company or escrow company will be
ignored); or
(c) The person is related to one of the
taxpayer's "agents" (as defined above).
(6) It is important to note (and frequently
overlooked) that the qualified escrow and
the qualified trust are intended as passive
vehicles to secure the buyer's performance
of his obligations to acquire and convey
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replacement property to. the taxpayer. If
the escrow agent or trustee assumes a more
active role (e.g., if such party contracts
to purchase replacement property and convey
it to the taxpayer), the escrow agent or
trustee must also qualify as a qualified
intermediary (discussed in paragraph (e),
infra).
(7) Reg. S11031(k)-l(g)(3)(v) provides that
the taxpayer may receive boot "from a party
to the exchange," but not from a qualified
escrow account or a qualified trust,
without affecting application of the safe
harbor. The clear implication of this
portion of the regulations is that, if the
taxpayer receives any boot from the
qualified escrow or qualified trust prior
to the occurrence of an event described in
Reg. Sl.1031)k)-l(g)(6), the benefits of
the safe harbor may be lost. Consequently,
if the taxpayer is to receive boot prior to
the occurrence of a "(g)(6) event," the
prudent course to follow is to be certain
that the boot is paid directly from another
party to the exchange to the taxpayer
rather than from monies held in escrow or
in trust.
(8) In this day and age when banks, savings and
loans and insurance companies routinely go
into bankruptcy or are taken over by
federal regulators, taxpayers and their
advisers must be concerned that the
obligation of the other party to the
exchange (or a qualified intermediary) be
secured by any cash or cash equivalent held
in a qualified escrow or a qualified trust.
Under the laws of most states, the mere
existence of the qualified escrow or
qualified trust does not per se create a
security interest in the monies held in
escrow or in trust.
(a) See, In re San Diego Realty Exchange,
Inc. v. Vaca, 132 B.R. 424 (Bkrtcy.
S.D. Cal. 1991) in which the debtor,
which performed services as a qualified
intermediary and qualified escrow
agent, entered into an exchange
agreement with Vaca. The debtor
received Vaca's property, sold it to a
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third party, deposited the proceeds of
sale in its general account and later
purchased and deeded replacement
property to Vaca. Unfortunately for
Vaca, the acquisition and deeding of
the replacement property occurred
within 90 days of the filing of the
debtor's bankruptcy petition. The
Bankruptcy Court refused to accept
Vaca's argument that the debtor held
funds in a "constructive trust" for
Vaca because the funds were commingled
with the debtor's other funds (and
those of other exchange clients).
Thus, the deeding of the replacement
property to Vaca was held to be a
preferential transfer.
(b) It will be difficult, if not
impossible, to created a perfected
security interest in the liquid
proceeds held by the escrow agent or
trustee under the laws of most states.
The safest course of action in light of
San Dieao Realty Exchange is probably
to use a qualified trust (in order to
create a stronger fiduciary relationship as opposed to a qualified escrow)
and to require the proceeds from the
sale of the taxpayer's property to be
held by the trustee in a segregated
account at all times.
e. The third safe harbor -- qualified

intermediaries. Often the prospective buyer of
the taxpayer's property will refuse to
cooperate in structuring a tax deferred
exchange. In such cases, taxpayers have
frequently attempted to use an intermediary to
accomplish the sale of the relinquished
property and at the same time facilitate a
deferred exchange under §1031. The
intermediary would typically enter into an
exchange agreement with the taxpayer pursuant
to which the taxpayer would convey its property
to the intermediary in exchange for the
intermediary's agreement to acquire and convey
replacement property to the taxpayer. The
principal tax risk was that the intermediary
would be found to be the taxpayer's agent and
that, as a consequence, the receipt of money or
other non-like kind property by an intermediary
-
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would be treated as having been received by the
taxpayer.
The deferred exchange regulations now offer a
very generous safe harbor for the use of a
"qualified intermediary" to facilitate an
exchange with the promise that, if complied
with, the intermediary will not be treated as a
taxpayer's agent for tax purposes and the
taxpayer will not be treated as being in actual
or constructive receipt of money or other nonlike kind property held by the intermediary.
See, Reg. Sl.1031(k)-l(g)(4)(i).
(1) A "qualified intermediary" is defined in
Reg. §l.1031(k)-1(g)(4)(iii) as

"

.

.

. a

person who (A) Is not a taxpayer or a
disqualified person [as defined in Reg.
S1.1031(k)-l(k)], and (B) Enters into a
written agreement with the taxpayer (the
"exchange agreement") and, as required by
the exchange agreement, acquires the
relinquished property from the taxpayer,
transfers the relinquished property,
acquires the replacement property, and
transfers the replacement property to the
taxpayer."
Note that the requirement in the former
proposed regulations that the intermediary
also receive a fee for its services has
been omitted from the final regulations.
However, this may be a meaningless change
since the final regulations require that
the intermediary be an independent third
party who is not likely to waive such a
fee.
(2) The exchange agreement that is required to
be entered into by the taxpayer and the
intermediary must include the following:
(a) The agreement must require that the
intermediary acquire the relinquished
property from the taxpayer, transfer
the relinquished property, acquire the
replacement property and transfer the
replacement property to the taxpayer.
Reg. Sl.1031(k)-l(g)(4)(iii)(B); and
(b) Restrict the taxpayer's rights to
receive, pledge, borrow, or otherwise
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obtain the benefits of money or other
property held by the intermediary to
the extent required by Reg. §1.1031(k)1(g)(6). Reg. S1.1031(k)-l(g)(4)(ii).
(3) Direct deeding is specifically sanctioned
in the final regulations in connection with
the qualified intermediary-safe harbor.
Although the qualified intermediary is
required to both acquire and convey the
relinquished property, Reg. Sl.1031(k)1(g)(4)(iv)(B) provides that an
intermediary will be treated as acquiring
and transferring the relinquished property
if the intermediary enters into an
agreement with a person other than the
taxpayer for the transfer of the
relinquished property to that person and,
pursuant to that agreement, the
relinquished property is transferred to
that person (i.e., direct deeded from the
taxpayer to the ultimate purchaser). It
should be noted that direct deeding is
sanctioned only if the intermediary first
establishes contractual privity with the
purchaser of the relinquished property.
However, Reg. §1.1031(k)-l(g)(4)(v) also
authorizes the taxpayer to enter into a
contract for the conveyance of the property
and specifically assign that contract to
the intermediary (which presumably may be
coupled with a direct deeding) provided
that all parties to the agreement are
notified in writing of the assignment on or
before the date of the relevant transfer of
property. Similar rules are also provided
with respect to direct deeding in
connection with the acquisition of the
replacement property by the qualified
intermediary and ultimate conveyance by it
to the taxpayer. See, Reg. S1.1031(k)l(g)(4)(iv)(C). Direct deeding is almost
essential because of concerns regarding
compliance with environmental laws and the
possible exposure that the intermediary
might face if it were included in the chain
of title.
(4) Many taxpayers prefer to use the qualified
intermediary safe harbor in conjunction
with a qualified escrow in order to better
secure performance by the intermediary and
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protect, to the extent possible, the monies
and other properties held by or for the
intermediary from claims of the
intermediary's creditors, including a
bankruptcy trustee. This tandem use of the
safe harbors is specifically sanctioned in
Reg. Slo1031(k)-l(g)(1) provided that all
the terms and conditions of each safe
harbor are separately satisfied.
(5) The taxpayer may receive boot directly from
another party to the transaction in
conjunction with the use of a qualified
intermediary but, just as in the case of a
qualified escrow and qualified trust, the
receipt of any monies from the qualified
intermediary (or the qualified escrow
agent) prior to the occurrence of an event
described in Reg. Sl.1031(k)-l(g)(6) will
not be permitted. See, Reg. Sl.1031(k)l(g)(4)(vii).
f. Fourth safe harbor

--

interest and growth

factors.
(1) Reg. §1.1031(k)-l(g)(5) provides that the
right of a taxpayer to receive interest or
a growth factor with respect to the
deferred exchange will not, in and of
itself, cause the taxpayer to be deemed to
have actually or constructively received
boot. Prior to the inclusion of this safe
harbor in the regulations (and its
counterpart in the prior proposed
regulations), a number of practitioners
questioned whether the taxpayer could
receive interest earned on funds held by an
intermediary and generally suggested that
all such funds should belong to, and be
retained, by the intermediary in order to
avoid having the intermediary treated as
the taxpayer's agent.
(2) Just as in the case of the other three safe
harbors, the interest or growth factor safe
harbor will not apply unless the taxpayer's
right to receive the interest or growth
factor are limited to the circumstances
described in Reg. §l.1031(k)-l(g)(6)
(discussed at IV.E.10.d.(4), supra).
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(3) Additional rules concerning interest or
growth factors are also set forth in Reg.
S1.1031(k)-l(h). This subsection of the
regulations provides that the interest or
growth factor rules will only apply to
economic benefits which depend upon the
length of time elapsed between the transfer
of the relinquished property and the
receipt of the replacement property. Reg.
S1.1031(k)-l(h)(1).
(a) Query: What if the exchange agreement
provides that, upon the taxpayer's
transfer of the relinquished property,
the transferee will deposit $100,000
(the value of the relinquished
property) in escrow and that the
taxpayer will be entitled to the
interest or other return earned from
the investment of the $100,000 by the
escrow agent during the term of the
escrow? It could be argued that the
interest or growth factor is dependent
not only upon the amount of time
elapsed between the transfer date and
the receipt of the replacement property
but also upon the nature of the
investment made by the escrow agent.
Although Reg. S1.1031(k)-1(h)(1) does
not provide a clear answer on this
point, both Treasury and Service
representatives have stated without
reservation at open meetings of the
American Bar Association Tax Section
that such a provision would qualify as
an "interest or a growth factor."
(b) Regardless of whether the interest or
growth factor is stated in terms of the
actual earnings derived from investment
of the monies held in escrow or is
stated in another manner, the deferred
exchange regulations do not address who
is to be taxed on income held in a
qualified escrow or qualified trust.
Section 468(B)(g) provides that nothing
in any provision of the law will be
construed as providing that an escrow
account, settlement fund or similar
fund is not subject to current income
tax. The Treasury has deferred
promulgating rules on the taxation of
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earnings within a qualified escrow or
qualified trust until regulations under
§468(B)(g) are published. See,
preamble to T.D. 8346. Thus, there is
still some question as to whose
taxpayer identification number should
be used when an escrow agent or trustee
invests funds held in a qualified
escrow or qualified trust.
If the taxpayer is entitled to receive
interest or a growth factor it will be
treated as interest, regardless of whether
it is paid to the taxpayer in the form of
cash or in property (including property of
a like kind). Reg. Sl.1031(k)-1(h)(2).
g. Transactional expenses. The final regulations
have added a significant corollary to the safe
harbor rules. Under Reg. Sl.1031(k)-l(g)(7),
the taxpayer's receipt of, or right to receive
any of, the following items will be disregarded
in determining whether all the terms and
conditions of the qualified intermediary,
qualified escrow and qualified trust safe
harbors have been met.
(1) Items that a seller may receive as a
consequence of the disposition of property
and that are not included in the amount
realized from the disposition of property
(e.g., prorated rents), and
(2) Transactional items that related to the
disposition of the relinquished property or
to the acquisition of the replacement
property and that appear under local
standards in the typical closing statement
as a responsibility of buyer or seller
(e.g., commissions, prorated taxes,
recording or transfer taxes, andtitle
company fees).
11. Boot "netting" when the relinquished property is
encumbered by a mortgage. As noted in IV.C.4.c.,
supra, if both the relinquished property and the
replacement property are encumbered by mortgages at
the time of an exchange, the taxpayer may "net" the
mortgages for purposes of computing the amount of
boot received in the exchange, and only the excess
of the mortgage balance on the relinquished
property over the mortgage balance of the
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replacement property will be treated as boot. In
the case of a deferred exchange, however, it will
presumably not be known at the time the
relinquished property is conveyed whether the
replacement property will be encumbered or, if so,
what the outstanding balance of the mortgage
encumbering the replacement property will be. The
deferred exchange regulations do not directly
address the application of the boot netting rules
to a deferred exchange, but an example contained in
one portion of the regulations illustrates that a
deferred netting of mortgages will be allowed.
Reg. §1.1031(k)-l(j) Ex. 5.
a. Query: If the "taxpayer" is a partnership,
will the constructive distribution rules of
§752(b) (which treat any relief from liability
as a constructive distribution of cash to the
partners) also defer the deemed distribution
until the replacement property is received? No
guidance has as yet been provided on this
issue.
12. Installment reporting of boot in deferred exchange.
The interrelationship of §§453 and 1031 is
discussed at IV.C.4.d., supra. On November 2,
1992, proposed regulations were issued which
provide guidance on coordinating the deferred
exchange rules with the installment sale
provisions. See, Prop. Reg. §l.1031(k)-l(j)(2).
The principal provisions of the proposed
regulations are as follows:
a. Deferred exchange safe harbors will apply for
installment sale purposes. The qualified
escrow, qualified trust and qualified
intermediary safe harbors of Reg. §51.1031(k)l(g)(3) and (4) will also apply for purposes of
determining whether a taxpayer has either
actually or constructively received a payment
under §453 and Temp. Reg. §15A.453-1(b)(3)(i).
Prop. Reg. §l.1031(k)-l(j)(2)(i) and (ii).
Thus, subject to the general provisions of
§§453 and 453A, taxpayers who comply with the
deferred exchange safe harbor requirements may
report any gain to be recognized on the
deferred exchange on the installment basis.
(1) The right to utilize the installment sale
provisions to defer recognition of gain in
a deferred exchange is conditioned upon a
"bona fide intent" on the part of the
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taxpayer to enter into and complete a
deferred exchange. Prop. Reg. S1.1031(k)1)j)(2)(iii). Thus, if the taxpayer
entered into a deferred exchange agreement
in December which he had no intention of
completing but was designed solely to shift
recognized gain into the next taxable year,
such gain must be reported in the earlier
year.
(a) The proposed regulations offer no
guidance on how the Service is to
determine whether the taxpayer had the
requisite bona fide intent. However,
this will necessarily involve a facts
and circumstances evaluation.
(2) The protection afforded by the proposed
regulations will expire upon the earlier
of:
(a) The time the safe harbor ceases to
apply under the deferred exchange
rules, or
(b) The end of the exchange period. Prop.
Reg. §1.1031(k)-1(j)(2)(i) and (ii).
b. Receipt of third party note. Receipt of a
purchase money note from the buyer of property
will not be regarded as a "payment" for
purposes of the installment sale rules unless
such note is payable on demand or is readily
tradable. S§453(f)(3) and (4).
However,
receipt of a note issued by a party other than
the buyer will be treated as a payment and the
amount of such payment will be equal to the
fair market value of the note. See, Temp. Reg.
Sl5A.453-1(b)(3). Prop. Reg. §1.1031(k)1(j)(2)(ii) creates a special exception to this
third party note rule that applies when a
deferred exchange is accomplished through the
use of a qualified intermediary. In such a
case, if the qualified intermediary obtains a
purchase money note from the ultimate purchaser
of the relinquished property and transfers the
note to the taxpayer, the note will be regarded
as a note received from the "buyer" of the
property (even though the intermediary, not the
ultimate purchaser, is the "buyer" of the
taxpayer's property).
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V. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 Changes Affecting Real
Estate Dispositions.
A. Passive Loss Changes.
1. One of the principal objectives of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 was to put an end, once and for all, to
the widespread use of tax shelters by high income
taxpayers to minimize or avoid taxes on their
regular sources of income. The principal
Congressional response to the tax shelter dilemma
was the addition of S469 of the Code which imposes
limitations on the use of losses and credits from
"passive activities" to shelter income from other
sources. Section 469 requires taxpayers to whom it
applies to divide all of their income, deductions
and credits into two separate "baskets." The first
basket (passive basket) consists of items
attributable both to trade or business activities
in which the taxpayer does not materially
participate and to certain rental activities. All
other income, deductions and credits are included
in a second basket (active or general basket).
Deductions generated by a passive basket activity
may only be used to offset income from the same
passive basket (and hence, may not be applied to
shelter income from the general basket) until the
taxpayer disposes of his entire interest in the
passive activity. Thus, a taxpayer may not use
losses from a passive activity to shelter his
wages, portfolio income or his income from a trade
or business in which he materially participates.
The limitations of §469 apply to passive activity
losses and passive activity credits of individuals,
estates, trusts, certain closely held C corporations and personal service corporations. S469(a).
2. There are two types of passive activities:
a. Trade or business activity in which the
taxpayer does not materially participate
(§469(c)(1)); and
b. A rental activity, regardless of whether the
taxpayer materially participates in the
activity (SS469(c)(2) and (4)).
3. Real estate professionals have argued since the
passage of S469 that the automatic classification
of all rental activities as passive activities
unfairly discriminates against them. For example,
a real estate professional who receives a
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substantial portion of his income in the form of
commissions or fees for the sale, development or
management of real estate (which would be included
in the general basket) could not offset his losses
from rental properties against such income, even
though he devoted a substantial amount of his time
and effort to the management of such rental
properties.
4. The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("RRA '93")*
modified §469 to exempt certain real estate
professionals from the automatic classification of
their rental activities as passive activities. In
other words, the rental activities of these real
estate professionals will be treated like any other
trade or business and, if the professional
"materially participates" in the rental activity,
gains or losses from such rental activity will not
be restricted under 5469.
a. The new relief provided under RRA '93 will only
be available to a taxpayer who meets the
requirements of 5469(c)(7)(B) (referred to
herein as a "Qualified Taxpayer"). A Qualified
Taxpayer is one who meets both of the following
requirements during the taxable year:
(1) More than fifty percent of the personal
services performed in trades or businesses
by the taxpayer during such taxable year
are performed in "real property trades or
businesses" in which the taxpayer
materially participates, and
(2) The taxpayer must perform more than 750
hours of services during the taxable year
in "real property trades or businesses" in
which the taxpayer materially participates.
(a) In the case of married taxpayers who
file a joint return, one of the spouses
must individually meet the 750 plus
hour requirement.
This is an annual test and must be met by the
taxpayer in each taxable year in which he or
she desires to take advantage of the relief
afforded by this new provision. Personal
services performed as an employee will not be
treated as performed in a real property trade
or business unless the employee is a "5 percent
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owner" (as defined in §416(i)(1)(B)) of the
employer.
b. A special rule applies in determining whether a
closely held C corporation will be regarded as
a Qualified Taxpayer. Under S469(c)(7)(D)(i),
such a corporation will be regarded as a
Qualified Taxpayer for a taxable year if more
than fifty percent of its gross receipts for
such taxable year are derived from real
property trades or businesses in which the
corporation materially participates.
(1) See, S469(h)(4) re: the standards for
material participation by a closely held C
corporation.
c. "Real property trades or businesses" are
defined in S469(c)(7)(C) as ". . . any real
property development, redevelopment,
construction, reconstruction, acquisition,
conversion, rental, operation, management,
leasing, or brokerage trade or business."
d. Taxpayers may treat each rental activity as a
separate activity or may elect to treat all
interests in rental real estate as one
activity. 5469(c)(7)(A). Since a Qualified
Taxpayer must satisfy the material participation test with respect to each activity in
order to remove profits and losses generated by
such activity from the restrictions of §469,
most taxpayers will presumably elect to
aggregate their rental properties.
(1) Query: Will a taxpayer be permitted to
regroup his rental businesses into a single
activity in 1994 to take advantage of the
new election to aggregate rental properties
into a single activity? Prop. Reg. §1.4694(g) appears to permit a fresh start in
1994 because the change in law under RRA
'93 will presumably constitute a "material
change in the facts and circumstances"
which the taxpayer may reasonably conclude
makes his previous grouping of rental
properties inappropriate.
e. The new changes are effective in taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1993. Passive
losses carried over from taxable years prior to
-
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the effective date will be treated as losses
from a former passive activity.
5. RRA '93 also added new S108(b)(2)(F) which adds
passive loss and passive credit carryovers to the
list of tax attributes to be reduced as a price for
excluding certain cancellation of indebtedness
income under §108(a).
B. Impact of Tax Rate Changes Upon Structuring Real Estate
Transactions.
1. Prior to TRA '86 taxpayers and their advisers
devoted much time and attention to converting
ordinary income into capital gain in the case of
property that was ripe for development. This
effort was motivated by the large disparity in
marginal rates between capital gains and ordinary
income. TRA '86 eliminated this difference and,
although a small disparity was restored in later
tax acts, the incentive to engage in this type of
planning was minimal at best. However, as a result
of the changes in marginal rates effected by RRA
'93, the difference between the top marginal rate
on ordinary income of individual taxpayers (39.6%)
and capital gains (28%) has now grown to 11.6%.
This degree of disparity may once again motivate
taxpayers to dust. off their plans from the pre-TRA
'86 era to convert ordinary income into capital
gain.
a. For example, the most popular type of planning
was a sale of property which was to be
developed to a controlled corporation in
exchange for an installment note. The
purchasing corporation would then take a
stepped-up "cost basis" in the property under
S1012 (provided that the transaction is
recognized as a sale for tax purposes and
provided that the purchase price equals fair
market value). Subsequent sales of lots
developed from the property would generate
ordinary income to the corporation, but the
profit derived from the original sale of the
undeveloped property by the taxpayer to his
controlled corporation would qualify for long
term capital gain treatment.
2. Potential problem areas must be considered in any
proposed installment sale of land which is designed
- 96 -

to provide increased cost basis to a controlled
corporation.
a. Installment notes may be treated as "debt
securities" received in a §351 exchange for
property; transferor's lower cost basis carries
over and creates additional taxable income to
corporation. Camp Wolters Enterprises, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 230 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 826 (1956); Campbell v. Carter
Foundation Production Co., 322 F.2d 827 (5th
Cir. 1963); and George A. Nye, 50 T.C. 203
(1968), acq. 1969-2 C.B. xxv.
(1) However, while corporation receives no
step-up in cost basis, interest is
generally deductible and debt securities
may be redeemed without dividend
equivalence.
b. A dreaded alternative is that installment notes
may be treated as "equity" and the equivalent
of stock received in a 5351 exchange with the
following results:
(1) Transferor's lower cost basis carries over
to corporation;
(2) Corporation receives additional taxable
income when it sells developed lots and,
after corporate taxes (if it is a C
corporation), additional earnings to
support a dividend distribution;
(3) Corporation loses deduction for interest
paid on the installment note; and
(4) Interest and principal payments received by
transferor will be taxed as dividends.
(5) Gooding Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408 (1954),
aff'd., 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957) (sale of
business); Agualane Shores, Inc., 30 T.C.
519 (1958), aff'd., 269 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.
1959) (sale of land); Truck Terminals,
Inc., 33 T.C. 876 (1960), aff'd., 314 F.2d
449 (9th Cir. 1963) (sale of equipment to
subsidiary); Burr Oaks Corp., 43 T.C. 635
(1965), aff'd., 365 F.2d 24 (7th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967)
(sale of land); Slappey Drive Ind. Park v.
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United States, 561 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1977)
(sale of land); Western Hills, Inc. v.
United States, 71-1 U.S.T.C. 9410 (S.D.
Ind. 1971) (successive sales of land);
Stanley, Inc. v. Schuster, 295 F.Supp. 812
(S.D. OH 1969), aff'd., 421 F.2d 1360 (6th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822
(1970) (sale of land); Florida-Georgia
Corp. v. United States, 331 F.Supp. 36
(M.D. GA. 1971) (sale of land); and Marsan
Realty Corp., 22 T.C.M. 1513 (1963) (sale
of land).
c. Factors which lead to adverse decisions noted
in b, above, include:
(1) Inadequate "thin" capitalization;
(2) Identity of interests between those who own
stock and notes;
(3) Intention not to enforce notes, e.g.,
interest and principal not paid when due;
(4) Notes subordinated to general creditors;
(5) Inflated price; and
(6) No overriding business purpose.
d. Installment sale may be respected if there is
demonstrated likelihood of early repayment.
Sun Properties v. United States, 220 F.2d 171
(5th Cir. 1955) (income from transferred
warehouse sufficient to pay expenses and
notes); Piedmont Corp. v. Commissioner, 388
F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1968) ($10,000 cash and
$160,000 notes equal value of option right to
purchase land, and there was a reasonable
probability that notes would be repaid. "Thin
capitalization" alone not sufficient to negate
a sale); Gyro Engineering Corp. v. United
States, 417 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1969) (income
from transferred apartment house was sufficient
to pay expenses and notes.
"Thin corporation"
doctrine held not applicable); Hollywood, Inc.,
10 T.C. 175 (1948), ac., 1948-1 C.B. 2 (sale
of land to corporation which did not develop
but, instead, resold in the same condition as
when acquired); Evwalt Development Corp., 22
T.C.M. 220 (1963) (sale of land to corporation
having "not negligible" capital, 14 months
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after it was formed; and notes given for prior
sales were paid promptly); Charles E. Curry, 43
T.C. 667 (1965), non-aca., 1968-2 C.B. 3,
withdrawing aca., 1965-2 C.B. 4, on this point
(sale of income-producing office building);
Arthur M. Rosenthal, 24 T.C.M. 1373 (1965);
Ainslie Perrault, 25 T.C. 439 (1955), aca.,
1956-1 C.B. 5, aff'd., 244 F.2d 408 (10th Cir.
1957); Sheldon Tauber, 24 T.C. 179 (1955),
aca., 1955-2 C.B. 9; Warren H. Brown, 27 T.C.
27 (1956), accr.,
1957-2 C.B. 4 (each involving
sale of business, and ascribing goodwill as an
asset which augmented capital). The Brown
decision suggests useful guidelines:
. . . the apparent intention of the
parties, the form of contract here in
question, the reservation of title in the
transferors until the full purchase price
is paid, the obvious business considerations motivating the partners to cast the
transaction in the adopted form, the
substantial investment by the transferors
in stock of the corporation, the superior
position of the transferors' claims to the
claims of other corporate creditors, the
fact that the contract price was equal to
the stipulated fair market value of the
assets transferred thereunder, the contract
provision calling for fixed payments to the
partners without regard to corporate
earnings, the provision requiring the
payment of interest to the transferors at a
reasonable rate, the absence of an
agreement not to enforce collection, and
the subsequent payment of all installments
which became due under the contract during
the years in issue

.

.

"

(27 T.C. at 35,

36).
e. Additional obstacles may also arise under the
installment sale rules.
(1) Limitations on sales of property to a
related party under §453(e). See,
discussion under II.B.4.a., supra.
(2) If selling taxpayer is deemed to be a
dealer with respect to the property sold,
installment reporting will not be available
on bulk sale of property. §§453(b)(2)(A)
and 453(1).
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(3) See, §S1274 and 483 if inadequate interest
rate charged or interest is not paid
annually.
(4) Caveat: Pledge rules under S453A(d) and
interest toll charges for privilege of
using installment reporting method under
5453A(b) and (c).
See, discussion under
II.C., D., E., and F., supra.
f. Consider use of rolling options as alternative
to installment sale. See, discussion in
III.B., su__a.
3. Taxpayer-seller may be adversely affected by the
"ordinary income activities" of controlled
corporation-purchaser.
a. Platting and other activity prior to sale may
indicate that it was "held for sale." Browne
v. United States, 356 F.2d 546 (Ct.Cl. 1966),
which referred to "substantial personal
development activities, plus use of sale to a
controlled corporation which continued the
development .

."

See, also, Tibbals v.

United States, 362 F.2d 266 (Ct.Cl. 1966);
Brown v. Commissioner, 448 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.
1971); Burgher v. Campbell, 244 F.2d 863 (5th
Cir. 1957). Although the corporate entity may
be recognized (Ralph E. Gordy, 36 T.C. 855
(1961), aca,, 1964-1 C.B. 4) and the activities
of the corporation will not be attributed to
the selling stockholder (Whipple v.
Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963)), nevertheless the selling shareholder's character as
a "dealer" may be indicated because he has
"utilized the company in his business," Tibbals
v. United States, supra, or as stated in
Buraher v. Campbell, because

".

. . all of his

buying and selling history (together with the
sale of the land) to a corporation controlled
by him and which immediately subdivided and
sold lots from it, is ample evidence . . .
that it was bought

.

.

. for that purpose."

(244 F.2d at 865).
b. Conclusion: One who is personally active in
real estate development activities will be more
exposed to "ordinary income" from a sale to a
controlled corporation.
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4. Query:
If one sells for "nothing down" with
installment payments as and when the corporation
develops and sells the land, is there not a joint
venture in which the seller is simply utilizing the
corporation in his business, as in Whipple v.
Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963)?
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